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The Reform of British 
Industrial Relations: 
The Donovan Report and the Labour Government's Policy Proposais 
Robert F. Banks 
Against a background of récurrent économie crisis in the 
1960s pressures hâve developed to reform Britain's trad-
itional industrial relations System. During the last two years 
the report of The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers" Associations and a subséquent Labour Govern-
ment White Paper included significant recommandations 
which are likely to change the character of the traditional 
System. Nevertheless both documents support an essentially 
voluntary approach to the reform of collective bargaining 
and reject the transformation of collective agreements into 
legally binding contracts. However, as a resuit both of 
growing public support for additional reforms and the 
improvement in the Conservative Opposition's political for-
tunes, plus doubts about the capacity of British unions and 
management to improve collective bargaining procédures 
voluntarily, the author suggests that further Government 
intervention in industrial relations is a strong possibility in 
the next few years. 
Introduction 
The 1960s hâve been a crisis 
décade for Great Britain. The main 
component of crisis has been es-
sentially économie as the Labour 
* Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Association, Report, Lon-
don, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Juin 1968, 346 pages. 
BANKS, Robert F., Assistant Profes-
sor, School of Labor and Industrial 
Relations at James Madison Col-
lège, Michigan State University. 
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Government, like its Conservative predecessor, has been caught in the 
grip of severe and persistent balance of payments déficits — the combined 
resuit of a post-war history of inflationary price rises and lagging growth 
rates. However, while thèse économie difficulties hâve been the most 
visible signs of Britain's malaise in the 1960s, they are only one of 
many problems : the necessity to adjust to the loss of a colonial empire, 
the grave costs involved in maintening her rôle as a world banker and 
the need to accept a markedly reduced status in the arena of international 
power politics. Moreover, the combined effect of thèse circumstances 
hâve, in turn, raised serious doubts about the capacity of Britain's 
traditional social and économie institutions to adapt to this harsh new 
domestic and international environment. 
The field of industrial relations provides one good example of this 
challenge to the capacity of traditional social institutions. Since the 
mid-1950s Britain's voluntary collective bargaining system and the rôle 
of the labor movement in contemporary society hâve been subjected 
to extensive criticism. This criticism grew more persistent in the 1960s as 
Britain's économie problems became more serious and intractible. As a re-
suit many observers both within and outside the world of work argued that 
the inflationary conséquences of free collective bargaining, the inability of 
unwillingness of unions and management to establish effective means of 
encouraging a more rapid rate of technological advance as well as coping 
with its attendant problems and a rising incidence of disruptive plant 
level industrial disputes were ail important factors in Britain's deepening 
économie malaise. In addition, Britain's industrial relations' problems 
also hâve become grist for the political mill. In the 1960s the Conserv-
atives hâve made the reform of industrial relations and the trade unions 
a major thème in their électoral campaigns. And even in the Labour 
Party similar pressures hâve built up, partly as a resuit of its attempt 
to become a social démocratie party supported by a broad-based electorate, 
but more specifically because of the realization that the reform of 
industrial relations is a necessary prerequisite for Britain's économie 
survival. 
It was against this background that demands grow for a gênerai 
review and reassessment of the British system of industrial relations. 
The move in this direction was further encouraged by several High Court 
décisions in the early 1960s which challenged traditional légal opinion 
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on the extent of légal protection which unions enjoyed under the law. 0) 
As a resuit late in 1964 the newly-elected Labour Government utilized 
a respected and time-honored approach in British politics for dealing with 
contentious public issues : it established a Royal Commission on trade 
unions and employers' associations to conduct a searching examination 
of British indutrial relations and to make recommendations for reform, 
including changes in labor law. <*> 
As is usual with Royal Commissions its membership was broad-based 
and représentative of the major interests involved. Its twelve members 
included two trade unions and four management représentatives, three 
industrial relations experts, plus three individuals, including the chairman, 
Lord Donovan, a High Court judge, who can be counted as independent 
public members. Moreover, also in line with normal practice the com-
mission conducted its internai délibérations in private with a large amount 
of time taken up with the considération of written évidence submitted by 
interested parties and the hearing of oral évidence, usually in public, 
from university industrial relations experts and représentatives of the 
unions, management and relevant government departments. Thèse sources 
of information were supplemented by the work of the commission's small 
research staff which conducted its own inquiries and commissioned a 
number of study papers by outside experts on key problems of industrial 
relations. Finally, after laboring for some three and one-half years and 
examining written évidence from some 430 organizations, groups and 
individuals, plus hearing oral évidence from some 78 similar sources, 
the commission published its long awaired report in June 1968. 
The main conclusions of the commission's report, which support with 
a limited number of important exceptions Britain's traditional voluntary 
approach to industrial relations, are both unexceptional and largely pre-
dictable. Moreover, its proposed solutions are in accordance with the 
expected direction of change in British industrial relations which probably 
would hâve occurred in any event over the next few years. Furthermore, 
in view of both the composition of the commission's membership and the 
C1) For a discussion of thèse cases see Olga L. Aikin, « Légal Perspectives » in 
B.C. Roberts (éd.) Industrial Relations, Methuen, London, 1968, pp. 229-30, 
237-39. 
(2) The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Association, 1965-68, 
H.M.S.O., London, Cmnd. 3623, 1968. In the following discussion référence to 
the commission's view or position on a particular issue always refers to its majority 
report, unless explicitly stated otherwise. The numbers inserted after quotations in 
the text refer to paragraph numbers in the report. 
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strength of Britain's historié tradition of voluntary industrial relations 
it is hard to believe that anything more than the commission's hopeful 
compromise could hâve emerged in any event. 
Specifically, I find little to quarrel with in gênerai about the report's 
conclusions; I am somewhat sympathetic to the commission's philosophy 
and approach and I find many of its recommendations admirable. I do 
believe, however, that the expected impact of the commission's cautious 
proposais for the reform of collective bargaining are far too optimistic in 
the light of the expérience of British industrial relations in the last few 
years. Modest support for this view is provided by the Labour Govern-
ment whose récent industrial relations White Paper goes further than the 
commission's report in proposing limited restraints on the right to strike. 
Moreover, if a Conservative Government is returned at the next General 
Election the commission's défense of an essentially voluntary collective 
bargaining System is likely to be rejected and replaced by a more legalistic 
policy toward industrial relations. 
The purpose of this article is : first, to critically review the Royal 
Commission's main recommendations and conclusions which focus on 
three spécifie problem areas : the reform of collective bargaining, its 
extension in British industry and the protection of the rights of individuals 
either as employées or union members.(3) Second, it hopes to provide 
an overall évaluation of the Royal Commission report, together with an 
assessment of both the Labour Government's and Conservative Oppo-
sition^ récent proposais for the reform of industrial relations. 
The Reform of Collective Bargaining 
The major focus of the Donovan report is an examination of the 
inadequacies of Britain's collective bargaining System and recommen-
dations for its reform. Either directly or indirectly eight of the report's 
fifteen substantive chapters deal with this issue. Moreover, the com-
mission's review of labor law also is largely addressed to the problems 
of collective bargaining for one whole chapter examines the possible con-
tribution that the légal enforcement of collective agreements can make 
to improving industrial relations. The commission's approach in this 
section of the report is best discussed in a systematic review of its views 
on the rôle of collective bargaining in British industry, the appropriate 
(3) The report also includes some important proposais for changes in labor law 
and recommendations on industrial training as vvell as extensive factual information 
on the institutional framework of the British System of industrial relations. 
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basis for its reform and what kind of rôle public policy should play in 
achieving this reform within the context of the contemporary industrial 
relations system. 
The most important gênerai conclusion of the report is that in prin-
ciple a largely voluntary system of collective bargaining is still relevant 
to Britain's contemporary économie and social circumstances. As the 
commission observes, « properly conducted, collective bargaining is the 
most effective means of giving workers the right to représentation in 
décisions affecting their working lives, a right which is or should be the 
prérogative of every worker in a démocratie society, (para. 212). » This 
central thème clearly identifies the report as a lineal decendent of previous 
public inquiries into British industrial relations — the Royal Commission 
of 1891, the Whitley Committee of 1917 and the Balfour Committee of 
1926. 
However, the report's support of collective bargaining goes one step 
further than the views of thèse past inquiries; it argues that public policy 
should déclare collective bargaining as a positive right of ail workers in 
British industry. Thus, as discussed in more détail below, the commission 
specifically proposes that collective bargaining should be extended in 
British industry through the establishment of procédures which would 
require employers to recognize unions. Alternatively, the report is also 
explicitly or implicitly unenthusiastic about such institutional arrange-
ments as the wages council system, joint consultation and workers' partici-
pation in management, which in its opinion cannot be effective substitutes 
for voluntary collective bargaining. 
However, a second important thème of the report is the commission^ 
sharp distinction between its strong support for collective bargaining in 
principle and its detailed criticisms of Britain's traditional bargaining 
institutions in practice. It argues that, « Britain has two Systems of indus-
trial relations. The one is the formai system embodied in the officiai 
institutions. The other is the informai system created by the actual be-
havior of trade unions and employers' associations, of managers, shop 
stewards and workers, (para. 46). » The report acknowledges that other 
countries also hâve both formai and informai Systems of industrial rela-
tions. « But in Britain (more than elsewhere) the informai system is 
often at odds with the formai system, (para. 52). » And in the commis-
sion's view, Britain's industrial relations problems stem from this conflict 
between Systems or more accurately from the basic irrelevance of tradi-
tional institutions and procédures to contemporary industrial relations 
problems. 
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The extent of this irrelevance is documented by the commission's 
comparison of descriptive models of the two Systems. The keystone of 
the formai System, or more accurately those collective bargaining procé-
dures which were established during the First World War or in the inter-
war period, is the industrywide collective agreement. Its dominance 
détermines other significant assumed characteristics of the formai System. 
In theory, ail important bargaining décisions are made by the national 
unions and industrywide employers' associations, while plant level labor 
relations are exclusively concerned with the interprétation and application 
of the national agreement. In addition, it is also assumed that under the 
formai System plant managers retain a wide degree of unilatéral decision-
making authority in labor relations, while the rôle of the shop steward 
is limited to policing the national agreement, collecting membership sub-
scriptions and providing a personal link between the union and its mem-
bership. One important additional characteristic of the formai system is 
the Government's neutral rôle in the collective bargaining process : state 
conciliation and arbitration services are normally provided only at the 
request of both parties and as a last resort; wage bargaining in the public 
sector follows the pattern set in private employment; and the minimum 
wage system is supposed to encourage the establishment of voluntary 
collective bargaining procédures in poorly organized industries. 
The commission freely admits that this simplistic model of the formai 
system never really operated precisely this way. Nevertheless, it was a 
close approximation to reality in the heavy unemployment of the inter-
war period. However the report's detailed review of Britain's post-war 
industrial relations shows at least six fundamental ways in which the 
formai system of industrywide bargaining has been transformed, modified 
and outmoded by the émergence of an informai system of plant bargain-
ing, which, in turn, supports the commission's important gênerai con-
clusions that « the practices of the formai system hâve become increasingly 
empty, while... the informai system (has) corne to exert an ever greater 
influence on the conduct of industrial relations... ; that the two Systems 
conflict; and that the informai system cannot be forced to comply with 
the formai system, » (para. 154). 
1. Industrywide agreements no longer provide an accurate guide to 
the character of plant level labor relations, either substantively 
or procedurally. Wage drift is pervasive in many industries as large 
gaps hâve opened up between basic wage rates and earnings which 
are largely the resuit of local bargaining in a full employment 
environment. Moreover, industrywide dispute seulement procédures 
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also hâve become ineffective either as a resuit of delays because 
of growing caseloads or more simply because they hâve been 
ignored; British industry has experienced a rising incidence of 
unofficial and unconstitutional strikes over local issues not covered 
by industrywide agreements, (paras. 57-64). 
2. Thèse developments indicate that key collective bargaining décisions 
hâve shifted from the industry level to the factory. Moreover, 
the commission points out three prominent unsatisfactory character-
istics of contemporary workplace bargaining : it is largely informai 
because of the prevalence of unwritten understandings jointly 
agreed by plant managers and shop stewards or custom and practice 
determined unilaterally by work groups; it is largely fragmented 
because différent groups get pay increases at différent times which 
resuit in compétitive wage adjustements and disorderly pay struc-
tures; and it is largely autonomous because it is not effectively 
controlled by the national unions or employer's associations, 
(paras. 65-69). 
3. The growth of workplace bargaining has challenged the rôle of the 
national employers' associations, which today still hâve an important 
rôle in collective bargaining only because industrywide agree-
ments exist and they are necessary to negotiate them. Apart from 
this function, however, they hâve played a négative and défensive 
rôle in industrial relations : « From 1914 until very recently every 
important innovation in industrial relations which has not been 
the work of the unions came from the Government or from indivi-
dual companies, » (paras. 75-82). 
4. The diminished status of employers' associations is largely a resuit 
of the willingness of individual firms in a full employment environ-
ment to bargain locally on a variety of issues. Moreover, such local 
negotiations are often haphazard and un-coordinated because many 
firms hâve not established a personnel function at ail, while in 
others this function has a low status in the management hierarchy 
or it was established only after the firm already had acquired disor-
derly pay structures and un-coordinated personnel practices, (paras. 
83-95). 
5. Management acceptance of local bargaining, together with full 
employment, has inflated the power of industrial work groups. 
Work group solidarity also has enhanced the position of the shop 
steward in the plant. In the main, the commission argues that the 
steward plays a vital rôle in a complex and un-coordinated bar-
gaining situation. « It is often wide of the mark to describe [them] 
as 'trouble-makers.' Trouble is [often] thrust on them. In circum-
stances of this kind they may be striving to bring some order into a 
chaotic situation, and management may rely heavily on their efforts 
to do so . . . For the most part the steward is viewed by others, and 
views himself as an accepted, reasonable and even moderating in-
fluence; more of a lubricant than an irritant,» (paras. 96-110.) 
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6. Finally, the commission observes that to a major extent while the 
« trade unions hâve also been as guilty as employers' associations 
of sustaining the façade of industrywide bargaining, » it is not so 
much that the unions hâve lost power as there has been a down-
ward shift of authority within them. In this regard the multi-union 
character of the British labor movement has strengthened work 
group independence in the plant in several ways. First, many 
trade union branches consist of small groups of members from a 
of différent factories. As a resuit the b ranch is divorced from the 
real business of the union at the place of work, but it nevertheless re-
mains the officiai means of contact between the union and its mem-
bers. Secondly full-time officers cannot easily keep in touch with 
small groups of members scattered over scores of factories. Thirdly, 
the several unions in a factory hâve to work together and in many 
plants shop stewards hâve formed multi-union committees. How-
ever, as a resuit of their extra-constitutional status, thèse committees 
are not easily made responsible to formai trade union structure 
outside the factory. (paras. 111-122). 
Based on this review the commission argues that any effective reform 
of collective bargaining must end the conflict between what it calls « the 
pretense of industrywide bargaining and the realities of industrial rela-
tions » and it specifically proposes a move to a formally decentralized 
bargaining system, involving the negotiation of comprehensive company 
or plant agreements. The commission believes that only within a bargain-
ing framework of this kind will it be possible to establish comprehensive, 
équitable and efficient pay structures, negotiations adequately covering 
issues such as restrictive practices, redundancy or employée discipline, 
effective grievance and dispute seulement procédures or agreements on 
the rôle and status of the shop steward in the plant. 
This analysis raises the question of to what extent can both sides of 
industry be expected to comply with thèse recommendations for a com-
prehensive system of factory or companywide agreements. Although in 
récent years there is some évidence of voluntary reform, a basically 
négative answer to this question is found in the commission's important 
conclusion that a majority of both sides of industry are satisfied with the 
current arrangements for industrywide bargaining, supplemented by in-
formai plant negotiations. And this satisfaction reflects three impressive 
advantages of the présent system which are usually claimed for a voluntary 
industrial relations system in comparison to a system supported by légal 
sanctions. The first of thèse is that : 
« they are comfortable arrangements. They do not demand [that] 
officiais of employers' associations [must] enforce décisions upon 
their members who are also their masters... (moreover) busy full-
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time officers [do not hâve to be] called in to deal with trivial détails 
within the factory... [finally] managers hâve considérable freedom 
to run their own industrial relations affairs.. . [and] shop stewards 
enjoy considérable autonomy. » (para. 127). 
« Secondly, the arrangements are flexible. They enable managers 
and stewards to circumvent rules and procédures which might other-
wise get in their way . . . » (para. 128). 
Finally, the traditional system gives the parties complète responsi-
bility for reaching agreements which they consider fair and reasonable. 
« a very high degree of self-government in industry is provided... 
managers and stewards hâve considérable freedom from outside inter-
férence (and) work groups are given scope to follow their own 
customs and to take their own décisions. » (para. 129). 
However, since the report has already demonstrated that the defects 
of the traditional system heavily outweigh its benefits, the fact that unions 
and management are résistant to change makes it clear that new public 
policy initiatives are necessary to achieve reform of collective bargaining. 
And in turn, an acceptance of this view means that the commission must 
décide what spécifie policy approach it should recommend. 
The Rôle of Public Policy 
This issue is central to the commission's délibérations for it involves 
the wider question of whether Britain's traditional voluntary approach to 
collective bargaining should remain or be amended to allow a greater 
intervention of the law. Although not without extensive debate and a 
monority report on this issue, a majority of the commission reject an exten-
sive use of légal sanctions in its program for the reform of collective bar-
gaining. <4) Instead, its approach is essentially the same as that proposed 
by Allan Flanders of Oxford University, who argued that collective bar-
gaining should be subjected « to a process of vigorous inquiry, making 
the parties answerable for their décisions, reviewing them in the light of 
agreed national policy and presenting practical recommendations for désir-
able reforms. » Or as Flanders quotes the Webbs' succint, almost half 
century old statement of this approach : the injection of the public interest 
(4) In his minority report (at pp. 300-302) Mr. Andrew Shonfield, director of studies 
at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs, argues the case for collective 
agreements in the form of contracts. 
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into private decision-making through a « full and continuons application 
of the principles of measurement and publicity. » <5) 
To implement thèse principles, the commission recommends two 
instruments of reform. First, the introduction of an Industrial Relations 
Act, which would require ail companies in the public and private sector, 
with the exception of the Civil Service, with 5000 or more employées to 
register collective agreements with the Department of Employment and 
Productivity (the old Ministry of Labour with expanded functions and a 
new title). The purpose of this act is two-fold : to emphasize the fact that 
the primary responsibility for the conduct of industrial relations rests with 
the board of directors of each particular company, thus downgrading the 
bargaining functions of the national employers' associations and to encour-
age the negotiation of factory of company agreements which compre-
hensively cover the key substantive and procédural issues of the employ-
ment relationship. 
The commission expects that in the first instance many industrywide 
agreements would be registered by individual companies. However, since 
many of thèse agreements are silent on the very key issues which the 
commission argues should be covered, it intends that initiatives by the 
Department of Employment and Productivity or the new Industrial Rela-
tions Commission (see below) would resuit in their modification or in 
the negotiation of supplementary plant or company agreements. Com-
panies also would be required to report in two other spécifie instances : 
when they were unable to reach agreement with the unions on a particular 
matter or did not recognize a union and therefore had no agreements to 
register. In this latter instance a company would be required to show that 
its employées were unwilling either to join or be represented by trade 
unions. 
Secondly, the Industrial Relations Act would establish a permanent 
Industrial Relations Commission (CIR) made up of full-time and part-
time members with its own administrative and reseach staff which would 
investigate cases referred to it by the Secretary of State for Employment 
and Productivity concerning the non-recognition of unions, the failure of 
(5) Allant Flanders, Collective Bargaining : Prescription for Change, Faber and Faber, 
London, 1967, p. 59. This is the published version of Mr. Flanders' évidence to the 
Royal Commission. 
THE REFORM OF BRITISH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 343 
a company to negotiate an agreement because of union opposition or 
cases in which the company's agreements fall short of a reasonable stand-
ard. (6) The report emphasizes that the IRC's main function will not be 
an arbitrator in particular disputes — although it is likely it would propose 
settlements in appropriate circumstances — but that of making recom-
mendations to achieve a gênerai reform of industrial relations in the long 
run. In this regard, the commission sees the CIR as the appropriate body 
to carry out inquiries into the gênerai state of industrial relations in a part-
icular industry or firm rather than entrusting such investigations to ad hoc 
government appointed committees, the method employed in récent years, 
for example, in labor relations inquiries in the docks and shipping industry. 
In short, the commission sees the basic impetus to a reform of 
industrial relations coming from the pressures of investigation and publi-
city generated by the reporting requirements of the new Act and the CIR's 
spécifie inquiries. Therefore, in line with this gênerai philosophy it pro-
poses no sanctions against unions or companies who reject the recom-
mendations of the CIR, although companies which failed to register its 
agreements or to report that it has no agreements and why would be liable 
to monetary penalties. 
The Rejection of Légal Sanctions 
The commission^ rejection of a legalistic industrial relations System 
is almost exclusively based on its analysis of what contribution the trans-
formation of collective agreements into legally binding contracts could 
make to solving the problem of unofficial strikes. (7> This proposai was 
(6) The commission recommends (at para. 182) that companies should use the follow-
ing criteria in reviewing their industrial relations practices; whether: comprehensive 
and authoritative collective bargaining procédures at company and plant level had 
been agreed with the relevant unions : redundancy agreements, joint grievance and 
disciplinary procédures (including in the final instance appeals procédures) had 
been introduced; regular joint discussions on measures to promote safety at work 
were held; and appropriate agreements had been negotiated concerning the rôle, 
fonctions, and status of shop stewards as workplace représentatives. 
(7) In the seventh chapter of the report the commission provides an excellent review 
of strike trends which shows that Britain has experienced a rising incidence of indus-
trial disputes since the war, of which on an annual basis in récent years 95 per 
cent were not officially sanctioned by the unions. The commission proposes no new 
procédures for dealing with officiai strikes, although (at paras. 439 and 448) it re-
commends that the Government hâve the option of using the IRC or ad hoc inquiries 
to investi gâte labor relations problem areas and that state industrial relations officers 
be given the duty of obtaining the full facts about unofficial strikes. 
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strongly supported by the central employers' body, the Confédération of 
British Industry and although in a slightly différent form, by the powerful 
Engineering Employers' Fédération, (i.e. legally binding procédure agree-
ments rather than substantive contracts), while being resolutely opposed 
by the Trades Union Congress and the labor movement generally. More-
over, this issue provoked an extensive debate and discussion within the 
commission itself, with no final agreement being reached until immediately 
prior to the préparation of its final draft report early in 1968. (8> 
The commission's approach to this question is essentially pragmatic 
as it argues that legally binding contracts on their own are both impract-
ical and irrelevant as a solution to Britain's unofficial strike problem. In 
addition, it implicitly incorporâtes the philosophie view that the law is 
not an appropriate instrument for an effective reform of industrial rela-
tions, if it seeks to change union-management behavior simply through a 
process of direct coercion. 
Specifically, the commission's argument can be summarized in three 
basic observations. First, it points out that at the présent time under cur-
rent law ail strikers are liable to court proceedings if they engage in strike 
action without giving appropriate notice to their employers; moreover, 
current law also does not prevent the parties from voluntarily agreeing 
between themselves that collective agreements should be legally binding. 
However, in practice most employers hâve been unwilling to institute 
légal proceedings for breach of contract for fear of damaging their rela-
tions with their employées, while in the second instance the parties them-
selves hâve decided that collective bargaining should remain outside the 
law to provide the maximum degree of flexibility and adaptability. 
Secondly, with regard to the practicality of applying légal sanctions 
either against unions or individual workers involved in illégal strikes the 
commission argues that the chaotic and highly flexible character of work-
place negotiations would pose substantial difficulties. For example, since 
most strikes are short stoppages involving a small number of workers and 
are the resuit of what the commission calls « the willingness of work 
groups to take action without regard to the procédure of collective bar-
gaining, « it would be difficult to hold unions responsible for actions over 
(8) For a glimpse of the commission's internai politics see « How George Woodcock 
Won on Points, » The Observer (London), June 16, 1968. 
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which they had no control. Moreover, the threat of sanctions against 
individual strikers is likely to be ineffective in preventing strikes; as sup-
porting évidence, the commission cites the large number of strikes which 
occurred between 1941 and 1951 in spite of the existence of the National 
Arbitration Order, which allowed for criminal proceedings against strikes 
initiated by the state.(9) 
Thirdly, and most important the commission simply argues that the 
introduction of legally binding agreements has no relevance to the real 
cause of unofficial strikes in British industry. This is not to be found in 
the main in « the désire on the part of a minority to make trouble and 
the irresponsibility or weakness of others, » but « our présent methods 
of collective bargaining and especially our methods of workplace bargain-
ing. . . (with) the absence of speedy, clear and effective disputes pro-
cédures, » (para. 475). The report goes on to assert that : 
« until this defect is remedied, ail attempts to make agreements legally 
binding are bound to defeat themselves. One of the principal objects 
of the factory and company agreements... will be to develop joint 
procédures for the rapid and équitable seulement of grievances. This 
is what is lacking at présent, and this is the indispensable condition for 
reducing the number of unofficial and unconstitutional strikes. To 
make the présent procédure agreements legally enforceable would be 
at variance both with our analysis of the causes of the evil and with 
our proposais for a remedy. It would direct attention from the under-
lying causes to the symptoms of the disease and might indeed delay 
or even frustrate the cure we recommend. It might perpetuate the 
existing procédures instead of replacing them by clear and effective 
methods of dispute settlement which at présent do not exist. (para. 
475).» 
In spite of its reasoned opposition to legally binding agreements, the 
commission does not make a once and for ail rejection of légal sanctions. 
It observes that if its proposais for the reform of collective bargaining do 
not lead to a considérable réduction in unofficial strikes, « then it may 
be necessary to reconsider the desirability and practicability of giving 
some légal support to procédure agreements. » (para. 476). However, in 
(<J) The commission also rejects (at paras. 489-499) proposais for the use of « auto-
matic » sanctions in strike in breach of procédure, Le. in the event of involvement 
in such strikes employées automatically would break their continuity of employment 
which, among other things, would adversely affect their eligibility for redundancy 
compensation. However, the commission argues that in reality such sanctions would 
not be automatic for they would hâve to be instituted and administered by the 
affected employer. 
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Une with its gênerai philosophy, the commission proposes that such a 
step be taken only after its recommendations hâve had a reasonable time 
to take effect. Moreover, it argues that legally binding contracts should 
be introduced as an ad hoc measure of last resort and for a limited period 
in only those cases in which it was demonstrated that in spite of the exist-
ence of an agreed disputes procédure, unconstitutional strikes continued 
to be a serious problem; that the employer concerned was prepared to 
use the sanctions made available to him; and that the enforcement of 
agreements was likely to resuit in a diminution of strike activity, (see 
paras. 511-16). 
The Reform of Collective Bargaining : Some Observations 
What, then can be said about the commission's proposais for the 
reform of collective bargaining ? In the first place, its argument in support 
of a decentralized bargaining System has merit for both pragmatic and 
practical reasons. The drift toward informai plant bargaining which has 
occurred since the Second World War will unquestionably continue in the 
future; the relevant issue is not the suppression of plant bargaining, but its 
reform. Moreover, the report's heavy emphasis on the need for greater 
management involvement in and responsibility for industrial relations is 
well-placed. In the final analysis, the capacity of British management in 
coming to grips with key problems such as demoralized plant wage struc-
tures, unofficial strikes and inefficient manpower utilization will détermine 
to a large degree the future quality of the United Kingdom's industrial 
relations. 
Secondly, on balance the commission's arguments against légal sanc-
tions are persuasive. It can be argued that its considération of this issue 
mainly with référence to the problems of unofficial strikes is a one-sided 
approach. For example, legally binding agreements could encourage to 
those employers who otherwise might be unwilling to take the necessary 
reform initiatives as well as to force the unions to face up to their inadé-
quate control of plant negotiations. Nevertheless, the commission's 
detailed review of the difficulties of enforcement shows that on balance, 
they outweigh the hypothetical advantages of legally binding agreements. 
The commission's support for a formally decentralized bargaining 
System not backed up either by legally binding agreements or IRC empow-
ered to make recommendations supported by légal sanctions has an im-
portant implication, however. This is that the reform of collective bar-
gaining inevitably will be slow and piecemeal for apart from pressure 
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exerted on the parties by the Department of Employment and Productivity 
and the proposed Industrial Relations Commission, the establishment of 
effective local bargaining procédures dépends on the willingness of unions 
and management to take the appropriate initiatives voluntarily. And, 
although recently there hâve been some encouraging signs of reform, 
on the whole both sides of industry hâve been unwilling to face up to the 
challenge of workplace bargaining. 
In spite of this, the commission remains optimistic about the possible 
extent and place of the reform of collective bargaining resulting from its 
recommendations. However, it is my view that not only is this optimism 
misplaced, but that the commission does not take into account some of 
the possible undesirable conséquences of its proposais. For example, the 
commission's support for public investigation unsupported by légal sanc-
tions as an appropriate reform mechanism appears to dépend on its 
assumptions that « the shortcomings of our existing industrial. . . relations 
are primarily due to the widespread ignorance about the most sensible 
and effective methods of conducting industrial relations and to the very 
considérable obstacles to the use of sensible and effective methods con-
tained in our présent system of industrial relations» (para. 204). Yet 
this hopeful notion of reform by persuasion and publicity clearly con-
tradicts the commission's earlier conclusion (paras. 128-130) that a 
majority of both sides of industry are satisfied with the current collective 
bargaining system for understandable, if not praiseworthy, reasons. 
However, this optimism does not simply flow from the commission's 
naive belief that the reform of collective bargaining will be achieved by 
a miraculous change in union and management attitudes. It is clearly 
aware that comprehensive company or factory agreements will be nego-
tiated only when it is in the interest of both sides of industry to do so. 
But repeatedly in its chapter on the reform of collective bargaining the 
commission argues that the growing importance of productivity bargain-
ing in British industry is significant évidence of the extent to which reform 
can be achieved by voluntary means. <10> In particular, it specifically 
(10) Productivity bargaining refers to those negotiations in which employers hâve 
granted substantial improvements in pay and working conditions in exchange for 
varions changes in work rules and practices. For a discussion of its current significance 
in Britain see Ken Jones and John Golding, Productivity Bargaining, Fabian Research 
Séries, No. 257, London, 1966 and the Royal Commission's Research Paper No. 4, 1. 
Productivity Bargaining; 2. Restrictive Labour Practices, London, H.M.S.O., 1967. 
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observes that the expérience of productivity bargaining may be a power-
ful force in changing union attitudes toward comprehensive factory agree-
ments. 
« of course, the transformation [of collective bargaining] would not 
take place if the [unions] refused to hâve anything to do with com-
prehensive factory agreements, but the expérience of productivity 
bargaining suggests that most of them will not do so. The benefits 
are too persuasive. Some may try to hold out, but they could not 
indefinitely resist the example of success elsewhere and pressure 
from their members and other unions, » (para. 173). 
There is no doubt that productivity bargaining has made a dramatic 
contribution to the reform of collective bargaining in certain instances. 
(Elsewhere in the report (at paras. 312-317) the commission stresses the 
important contribution productivity bargaining can make to the eradication 
of restrictive practices and it correctly rejects Mr. Andrew Shonfield's 
proposai for a restrictive practices tribunal backed up by légal sanctions.) 
But in this particular chapter of the report, the commission superficially 
discusses the caracter of productivity bargaining without taking account 
of its features which are likely to limit the extent of its gênerai applica-
bility.(11) However, actual reviews of this expérience indicates that pro-
ductivity bargaining makes heavy demands on both unions and manage-
ment, meaning that such negotiations are rarely undertaken unless both 
parties believe that their benefits will outweigh the heavy costs in terms 
of money, time, internai organizational pressures and pre-bargaining 
préparations. It is by no means clear that a substantial number of firms 
hâve the capacity or the willingness to make the necessary committment 
or that in a majority of instances, particularly from the union's point of 
view, the benefits are greater than the costs. 
In addition, the commission's heavy emphasis on productivity bar-
gaining ignores the fact that in many cases this type of négociation may 
be impossible or only hâve limited applicability. Yet under tight labor 
market conditions plant bargaining will nevertheless occur, based on the 
traditional arguments of wage comparability, labor shortages, cost of 
living and company profitability. And there is nothing in the commission's 
recommendations to prevent thèse negotiations from being conducted with 
the same chaotic, inflationary conséquences experienced in the past. 
(u) However in the chapter on « The Efficient Use of Manpower » (at paras. 318-
329) the commission provides more balanced discussion of productivity bargaining. 
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Moreover, in this regard two of the commission's other recommen-
dations may unintentially encourage a continuation of local negotiations 
of this traditional variety. First, the recommendation that ail firms with 
less than 5,000 employées initially be excluded from the scope of the 
proposed Industrial Relations Act may resuit in an undesirable balkan-
ization of the bargaining system. For even on the assumption that com-
prehensive company agreements will be negotiated by many of the larger 
firms, presumably the smaller excluded employers will continue to be 
covered by national agreements, supplemented by informai plant bargains. 
And the coexistence of both kinds of employer in the same labor market 
may well produce a situation in which the smaller employers will be 
forced to accept inflationary pay settlements as a resuit of the wage leader-
ship of their large-scale competitors. Secondly, the commission's recom-
mendations for union récognition, which are discussed below, are likely 
to resuit in a substantial growth of white-collar unionization, particularly 
in the jurisdiction of two of Britain's most dynamic unions — The 
Draughtsman's and Allied Technician's Association and the Association 
of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs. Since both thèse unions are 
noted for their agressive stratégies of plant bargaining, based on intra-
and interfirm pay comparisons, a growth in their strength is also likely 
to contribute to inflationary wage pressures. 
In short, while the commission's proposais will clearly encourage 
some reform of collective bargaining, assuming that the Government and 
the CIR adopts an aggressive investigatory posture, in the final analysis 
any widespread reform dépends on the acceptance by both sides of industry 
of the desirability of a formally decentralized bargaining system. But it is 
évidence of widespread support of this kind which is specifically lacking 
at the présent time. 
Finally, several brief comments must be made about the scope of 
the commission's review of the collective bargaining system. Although 
this is never stated explicitly in the report, the analysis focuses exclusively 
on bargaining in the private sector and particularly on the bargaining 
expérience of the auto industry and the métal trades. Although this em-
phasis is understandable in view of the unsatisfactory industrial relations 
record of thèse industries, it means that any detailed discussion of col-
lective bargaining in the public sector, either in the nationalized industries 
or in the Civil Service is excluded. 
The commission's silence on this issue poses several questions. For 
example, are its proposais for decentralized bargaining applicable to the 
nationalized industries, which are included in the scope of the proposed 
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Industrial Relations Act, in the same way as to private industry ? More-
over, does the commission's exclusion of bargaining procédures in the 
Civil Service from the scope of the Act mean that their effectiveness is 
accepted without question ? Probably not, for recently it has been argued 
that Civil Service bargaining procédures operate both to limit the scope 
for improvements in manpower utilization and to encourage the spread 
of inflationary wage pressures across the economy.(12) A confrontation of 
thèse issues at a minimum would require a gênerai review of the Civil 
Service System of « fair comparisons » in wage bargaining and the extent 
to which productivity negotiations could be coordinated with thèse pro-
cédures. Ail thèse issues are complex and difficult, but their exclusion 
by a commission given the time, ressources and charge to make a com-
prehensive review of collective bargaining is hard to understand. 
The Extension of Collective Bargaining 
The second major group of the commission's policy recommendations 
are designed to achieve an extension of collective bargaining in British 
industry. This goal, which logically flows from the commission's gênerai 
support for collective bargaining, is to be attained largely through the 
removal of barriers to union récognition. 
As the report points out, although since the end of the nineteenth 
century the British Government has adopted a positive attitude toward 
union récognition, as a resuit of its support of voluntary collective bar-
gaining as a socially désirable public policy, it « has taken little positive 
action to encourage workers to join unions or to protect them from 
retaliatory action by their employers » (para. 213). And this is in spite 
of the fact that the British Government has ratified the two relevant 
conventions of the International Labor Organization which concern the 
freedom of association of employées and their right to organize and 
bargain collectively. However, with the concurrence of the British labor 
movement, législation providing for the légal enforcement of thèse rights 
has never been introduced on the grounds that the unions hâve been able 
to effectively expand organizational strength by their own efforts. 
Therefore, with the exception of the public sector, neither the law 
nor public policy prevents an employer from deliberately obstructing his 
employées' freedom of association by acts of individual discrimination or 
(i2) p o r example, in the various reports of the National Board for Priées and Incomes. 
In particular in NBPI Report No. 18, Pay of Industrial Civil Servants Cmnd. 3034, 
H.M.S.O., London, 1966. 
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various policies limiting union récognition. <13> But, the commission argues 
that there is current évidence indicating the significance of such activities 
in British industry ; in récent years a growing number of strikes hâve 
occured over union récognition and about 30 percent of ail disputes in 
which government industrial relations officers conciliate concern this issue. 
More important, however, is the fact that the organizational future of 
the British labor movement, as in most other western industrial countries, 
dépends on its ability to recruit white-collar workers. But although there 
has been a dramatic absolute increase in the number of white-collar 
unionists since the war, an overall décline of unionization in the whole 
labor force has occurred because thèse gains hâve not offset the large 
membership losses which hâve been the resuit of employment contractions 
in traditional centers of union strength. In addition, although 30 percent 
of ail white-collar workers are currently in unions, there is only a 12 
percent density of unionization in private manufacturing employment, as 
the bulk of white collar members are found in the public sector. 
In responding to the implication of thèse union membership trends, 
the commission bluntly rejects as « increasingly unrealistic and out of 
date» (para. 221) employers' views that union membership is inappro-
priate or undesirable for white collar workers. It also argues that employer 
attitudes and policies on the issue of union récognition for this group 
of^mployees has been and is a key variable influencing their willingness 
to become union members. 
In a summary of its view, the commission argues that (para. 224): 
« There is a new dilemma for public policy. Collective bargaining is 
recognized as the best way of conducting industrial relations and as 
depending on strong trade union organization. The proportion of em-
ployées who are organized has however been declining. Employment 
is increasing in areas which hâve proved difficult to organize, so 
that the effect of obstacles to the development and récognition of 
unions in thèse areas is assuming greater importance for the future 
of collective bargaining. The évidence is that if thèse obstacles are to 
be surmounted more effective means of dealing with problems of trade 
union récognition are needed. » 
(13) In the public sector the nationalized industries hâve a statutory duty to bargain 
with unions representing their employées. Moreover, the Government's own em-
ployées are encouraged to join the appropriate union and their wages and conditions 
are determined through collective bargaining. Finally, Government contractors are 
obliged to recognize the freedom of their employées to join unions and must provide 
wages and conditions no less favorable than those negotiated in the relevant collective 
agreements in their industry. 
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The commission makes four spécifie proposais to deal with this 
problem. The first two relate specifically to the freedom of association 
of individual employées, while the others concern the issue of union 
récognition and the extension of collective bargaining. First, the commis-
sion proposes that the right of union membership should be positively 
protected under the law : no employer should be able to require as a 
condition of employment that an employée should not belong to a union 
(the police and armed forces are the only exceptions to this recommen-
dation). Secondly, no friendly society (any voluntary benefit organization) 
should be allowed to stipulate in its rules that union members be excluded 
from membership or from receiving full benefits. (This recommendation 
is specifically directed at the Foreman and Staff Mutual Benefit Society 
which provides a variety of social benefits to more than 60,000 members 
employed in supervisory and similar grades in the shipbuilding and 
engineering industries. The society which bars unionists from membership, 
was claimed to hâve been a significant anti-union influence by the white 
collar unions in thèse industries). 
Of the other two recommendations, the first concerns modifications 
in the wages council system to encourage the growth of voluntary collective 
bargaining, while the second has the potential of being one of the com-
mission's most significant recommendations. (14) This is the proposai that 
the Industrial Relations Commission should be empowered to investigate 
cases referred to it by the Minister of Productivity and Employment 
involving union récognition, including récognition disputes between unions. 
In Une with its gênerai philosophy of légal abstention, the report does 
not propose any penalties against either party for rejecting the CTR's 
recommendations, although, as in the case of legally binding agreements, 
it admits that the question of sanctions would hâve to be reviewed in 
light of expérience. 
However, later in the report the commission does propose a modified 
form of sanctions against employers in récognition disputes. In certain 
circumstances unions would be granted the right of compulsory unilatéral 
arbitration — an arrangement under which it could take an employer 
(14) The commission (at paras. 262-266) makes four recommendations for changes 
in the wages council minimum wage system to encourage its replacement by volun-
tary collective bargaining. The most important of thèse proposais are that the 
Government be empowered to consider the abolition of a wages council at the request 
only of the union or unions in the industry concerned and that firms in which 
effective voluntary negotiating procédures exist may be exempted from the jurisdiction 
of the wages council at the individual or joint request of the parties involved. 
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to arbitration by the Industrial Court without prior joint agreement. 
In particular, the commission envisages that this power could be granted 
(para. 273): 
« First, where the employer rejects a recommendation of the (Indust-
rial Relations) Commission to grant récognition... (for) this will 
give (the union) at least a foothold and may encourage the employer 
to change his mind. Secondly, even where the employer accepts a 
recommendation to grant récognition... he may be able to exploit 
the position to reduce bargaining to a mockery. Thirdly, the commis-
sion's investigations may reveal circumstances of this kind even in 
industries in which unions are already formally recognized. Hère 
again it should be empowered to recommend unilatéral arbitration. » 
However, the commission intends that union access to unilatéral 
arbitration would be granted on an ad hoc and sélective basis, and only 
after an investigation by the CIR, which would hâve taken into account 
the views of the affected employer. Moreover, the investigation would 
hâve to demonstrate that access to unilatéral arbitration would « contribute 
to the growth or maintenance of sound collective bargaining, » (para. 274). 
The commission's recommendations in the field of union récognition 
are in line with its gênerai philosophy of encouraging the reform and 
extension of collective bargaining. Nevertheless, they are radical proposais 
for the leading employers bodies — the Confédération of British Industry 
and the powerful Engineering Employers' Fédération — were opposed 
to government involvement in this area. However, a number of employers' 
groups, Britain's larger unions and the TUC were in favor of récognition 
législation, although not ail thèse groups supported the commissions 
spécifie reconmmendations. (15> Moreover, it is likely that the implement-
ation of thèse recommendations will encourage a significant growth in 
trade union merbership, particularly in the field of white collar employ-
ment. However, it remains to be seen if they will resuit in an overall rise 
in unionization in the labor force as a whole. 
Space limitations require that comments will be directed only to 
the report's recommendations on union récognition. Hère my quarrel 
is not with the principle involved in the recommendations, but with 
the quality of the guidance the commission provides for the development 
of public policy in this area. For since the report only contains four 
(15) See the discussion of thèse issues in George Sayers Bain, Trade Union Growth 
and Récognition, Royal Commission on Trade Union and Employers' Association, 
Research Paper 6, London, H.M.S.O., 1967, pp. 99-101. 
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paragraphs which discusses the rôle of the CIR in union récognition 
cases, it offers few guideposts for dealing with the difficult issues posed 
by its recommendations. 
However, little reflection is needed to outline some of thèse issues. 
For example, under what circumstances would the Minister refer a case 
to the tribunal ? Automatically in ail cases in which a firm indicated 
it had no collective agreements covering either ail or particular groups 
of its employées ? At the request of the union or unions concerned, 
or as the report implies, only in those cases in which disputes over 
union récognition actually occured ? Secondly, there is the issue of which 
union or unions should be accorded récognition rights which in turn 
pose other thorny questions : the degree of membership support required, 
the scope of the unit in which récognition is accorded and the extent 
to which an employées interests should be taken into account, if at ail, 
in deciding whether a particular union should be able to represent a 
particular group of employées. Finally, there is the question of whether 
sanctions should be applied against either of the parties wlio refuse 
to hâve the case considered by the IRC or reject its findings. 
The commission is clearly aware of ail of thèse issues.(18) As already 
pointed out, it accepts the possibility of reconsidering the question of 
légal sanctions in light of the tribunal's expérience. But even in the 
short run it is probable that some kind of protection would hâve to be 
given to an employer against strike action by the losing union in an 
inter-union récognition dispute. On the other issues such as the repre-
sentedness of unions or the scope of the bargaining unit the report is 
purposively silent. This is not only because thèse are controversial ques-
tions, but also to give the IRC the maximum degree of flexibility in 
devoloping appropriate principles based on its case expérience. There is 
much to be said in favor of the évolution of principles in a case-by-case 
approach, instead of the introduction of rigid principles or criteria at 
the outset. Yet an acceptance of this principle surely does not preclude 
any gênerai discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of various 
principles and criteria which could give guidance to the tribunal in its work. 
Another criticism of the commission's recommendations is that no 
attempt is made to explore the possibility of the tribunal's rôle as a 
rationalizer of Britain's complex union structure. Indeed, the commission 
argues specifically that any fundamental change in union structure must 
(16) Bain, op. cit., pp. 82-92. 
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be made within the labor movement. And with regard to this issue the 
report proposes that one method of reform would be for the Trades 
Union Congress to adopt the principle of « one union for one grade of 
work within one factory (para. 691). » The application of this principle 
could be established through TUC sponsored joint agreements designating 
one union as représentative of one grade of workers in a plant as well 
as by TUC intervention into inter-union récognition disputes to détermine 
which of the competing unions should be granted exclusive jurisdiction 
rights. 
It is doubtful whether the TUC would be willing to intervene 
extensively into this controversial area, but the commission is right to 
assume that any fundamental reform of union structure must corne from 
the labor movement. Yet a willingness to apply the « one union for one 
grade of work » principle by the CIR in récognition disputes could 
encourage a more simplified union structure, particularly in previously 
unorganized white collar jurisdictions. And this would be true even if 
the CIR only décides a small number of cases and the principle could not 
be applied unambiguously in ail circumstances. 
Finally, the commission's recommendation that unions be given 
access to unilatéral arbitration in certain circumstances must be critically 
examined. Again the report provides little guidance on the development 
of public policy. Obviously in those cases in which an employer rejects 
a recommendation by the commission to recognize a particular union 
it would be possible to détermine quite easily whether access to unilatéral 
arbitration should be granted. However, it is also envisaged that such 
access also could be granted in cases in which unions are recognized 
in the firm, but the employer is able « to exploit the position to reduce 
bargaining to a mockery,», (para. 273). Clearly, in its investigation of 
thèse cases the CIR must hâve some criteria to détermine whether or 
not this is so, or, in North American terminology, it will hâve to décide 
whether an employer is « bargaining in good faith. » And it is precisely 
on the issue of applying this principle in practice that the commission's 
report should hâve given some guidance to the CIR. 
In conclusion, one can be sympathetic to the commission's dilemma 
in making controversial recommendations in the field of union récognition, 
while not wishing to raise the thorny practical issues connected with 
their application. Moreover, it is right not to lay down rigid criteria 
or guidelines which might create problems for the CIR. Yet surely some 
discussion of the policy implications of its recommendations can be 
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justified in view of the controversial nature of the issue of union récogn-
ition. And the fact that this is not provided is clearly a major shortcoming 
of the report. 
Protecting the Rights of Union Members and Employées 
Finally, the commission^ third group of major recommendations — 
those concerning the protection of the rights of individuals both as union 
members and employées — must be briefly examined. Although thèse 
particular recommendations did not receive extensive public attention 
following the report's publication, in the long run they are likely to hâve 
a significant impact on the British industrial relations system. 
Union membership rights was an important topic on the commission's 
agenda for several reasons. In the first place, the law relating to internai 
union affairs had not been systematically examined for almost a century. 
In addition, in récent years the public had become concerned about this 
issue as a resuit of several prominent court cases involving union électoral 
malpractices and other unjust abuses of union power. (17> Moreover, the 
commission itself argued that since its recommendations in the area of 
collective bargaining and union récognition would serve to strengthen 
union power, a review of the extent to which union membership rights 
were protected was imperative. 
The commission's approach to this issue is carefully balanced to 
take account both of union requirements as social institutions and 
individual membership rights. For example, it observes that currently there 
is no évidence of any widespread abuse of union power, and after a 
detailed considération of the arguments on both sides, it rejects any 
blanket prohibition of the closed shop (see paras. 588-602). Never-
theless, the commission does accept the need for a change in public 
policy to adequately safeguard union membership rights. 
Specifically, it proposes two instruments of reform. First, ail unions 
should be required to up-date, amend or clarify their internai iules and 
procédures, particularly with respect to the following issues : admission 
and disciplinary procédures, disputes between a union and a member, 
gênerai union élections and the élection and authority of shop stewards. 
(17) The most famous of thèse cases involved électoral malpractices in the Electrical 
Trades Union. Court action resulted in the removal of the union's commimist leader-
ship. See. C.H. Rolph, AU Those in Favour ? The E.T.U. Trial André Deutsch, 
London, 1962. 
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The extent to which union rules met an acceptable standard on thèse 
issues would be determined by a newly established Chief Registrar of 
Trade Unions and Employers Associations, who would carry out thèse 
new duties in addition to the limited trade union functions previously 
performed by the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies. The Registrar's 
power in this regard stems from another commission recommendation 
that ail unions (and employers' associations) be required to register and 
be granted corporate status under the law. 
Secondly, the commission accepts the « view (that) the connection 
between membership of a trade union and employées' livelihoods means 
that trade unions cannot be regarded simply as voluntary clubs from the 
member's point of view». (para. 630). Therefore, it recommends the 
establishment of an independent review body to which any union member 
would hâve a right of complaint in the last resort. 
The proposed independent review body would hâve three members 
— a lawyer as chairman and two trade unionists appointed by the Minister 
of Employment and Productivity — and full powers to call witnesses and 
obtain évidence in its délibérations. This tribunal would be empowered 
to deal with four kinds of cases : 1 ) those involving an unfair imposition 
of penalties which amount to a substantial injustice as well as instances of 
membership expulsion or admission refusais; 2) cases based on a breach 
of union rules or a violation of the principles of natural justice; 3) élec-
toral malpractices or complaints raised with respect to the laws concerning 
union amalgamations or the political contributions of union members; 
and 4) disputes between the Registrar and a union over whether its rules 
comply with the law. <18) In cases of arbitrary expulsion, membership 
admission refusais or the imposition of unjust penalties, the review body 
would be empowered to award compensation to a successful appellant 
against the offending union in various amounts up to a limit of two years 
pay calculated at a rate of 40 pounds per week. Finally, the review body's 
décisions are to be final and binding with appeals to the High Court allow-
able only on points of law. 
Although the commission intends that the review body will be a 
mechanism providing for the rapid resolution of thèse cases, it does not 
envisage that it will be the only procédure to deal with complaints. In 
fact, heavy emphasis is placed on the desirability of settling cases before 
(18) The commission was particularly concernée with the abuse of power in closed 
shop situations and in union élections. As a resuit the report spells out in détail those 
spécifie circumstances in closed shops in which union members should hâve a right 
of appeal and the procédure to be followed in cases of suspected électoral malpractice. 
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they reach the review body. For example, ail appellants are to exhaust 
their unions' internai appeal procédures, subject to a time limit of three 
months, before their complaints can be heard by the tribunal. In addition, 
ail complaints are to be addressed initially to the Registrar who is to seek 
to promote satisfactory voluntary settlements. Finally, the review body 
will restrict access to its agenda by considering only those cases involving 
« substantial injustice » and by refusing not to hear more than one com-
plaint submitted by any one appellant, unless, on the merits of the case, 
another hearing is considered justified. 
The protection of employée rights in industry is the subject of the 
commission's final important recommendation. In particular, the report 
recommends safeguards for workers against unfair dismissal through the 
introduction of législation providing individuals the right of appeal to an 
independent tripartite tribunal. 
This proposai must be seen in the context of the graduai, bat signi-
ficant change in public policy on the issue of employée security in industry 
which has occurred in Britain since the early 1960s. Before then voluntary 
collective bargaining was favored over a législative approach, but as a 
matter of fact spécifie issues such as sick pay, pensions, dismissals and 
redundancy notices and compensation were neither generally not adequately 
covered by collective agreements. However, in 1963 and 1965 respectively 
the Contracts of Employment and Redundancy Payments Acts were in-
troduced to provide by statute minimum periods of notice and payments 
to redundant workers, geared to âge and length of service. Moreover, 
in 1964 the Labour Government announced its acceptance of the ILO's 
1963 Recommendation of Termination of Employment and the Minister 
of Labour's tripartite National Joint Advisory Council set up a committee 
to study the question of unfair dismissals and dismissal procédures. 
This committee's report concluded that although most employées 
received substantially more protection against unfair dismissal than the 
minimal safeguards provided under the common law, adéquate dismissal 
procédures exis'ced mainly in larger firms and that it was the exception, 
rather than the rule, that an employée had a final right of appeal to a 
joint union-management body or an independent tribunal. (19> Moreover, 
the report indicated as an important measure of the ineffectiveness of 
current procédures was that a significant number of strikes had occurred 
over dismissals in récent years. The committee recommended that the 
« immédiate program should be to encourage the development and 
extension of satisfactory voluntary procédures. » But at the same time it 
(19) Dismissals Procédures, H.M.S.O., London, 1967. 
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concluded that there were « strong arguments against the introduction at 
an early date of législation to provide for statutory machinery (on dis-
missals). » Members of the full NJAC approved the report's gênerai 
recommendations, but the TUC argued in favor of législation guaranteeing 
a statutory right of appeal, a view which was rejected by the CBI. 
The Royal Commission's considération of this issue is an extension 
of thèse earlier délibérations. However, the commission (at paras. 533-
539) strongly rejects the NJAC report's objections to législation on em-
ployée dismissals. In addition, it goes on to argue that législation had 
several positive advantages : namely, to extend the implementation and 
raise the standard of dismissal procédures generally across British 
industry; to safeguard employées in the event of employer retaliation 
against union members; and to offer an opportunity for appeals against 
dismissal décisions to an external and independent third party. 
In short, the commission recommends the introduction of législation 
which would stipulate (following the ILO Recommendation) that ail dis-
missals would be invalid unless they occurred as a resuit of a reason 
« connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the 
operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service. » 
(para. 545). Reasons for dismissal such as union membership or activ-
ities, race, color, sex, marital status, religious or political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin would be deemed unfair, with the involved 
employer or employée respectively being required to justify the reasons 
for the dismissal or to indicate any spécial grounds on which it could be 
held to be unfair. <20> 
Under the proposai virtually ail employées would hâve the right of 
immédiate appeal, or no later than within five working days of the dis-
missal, to one of a number of tripartite industrial tribunals which would 
sit on a regular basis in the major industrial centers of the country. In 
the event of an unfair dismissal being proved the tribunal could grant 
the appellent various amounts of compensation up to a limit of two years 
pay calculated at a rate of 40 pounds per week as primary relief, with 
the possibility of reinstatement as a secondary remedy if this was accept-
able to both parties. Finally, the tribunal's décisions would be final and 
(20) The commission also proposes that employées who are dismissed because of the 
imposition of a formai closed shop agreement or as a resuit of pressure by their 
workmates should hâve the right of appeal against their employer on the grounds 
of unfair dismissal. However, a five member minority of the commission, including 
Lord Donovan, opposed this recommendation and proposed instead that in thèse 
cases complaints should be lodged against the union with any compensation paid 
by the union and not the employer. 
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binding, with appeals allowed to the High Court only on points of law. 
(Elsewhere in the report in conjunction with the above recommemdations, 
the commission proposes that the industrial tribunals which were establish-
ed to hear appeals under the Redundancy Payment Act be expended 
into multi-purpose labor tribunals whose jurisdiction would be, with the 
exception of court action involving claims for damages arising out of 
accidents at work, « ail disputes arising between employers and employées 
from their contracts of employment or from any statutory claims they 
may hâve against each other in their capacity as employers and em-
ployées, » (para. 573). However, excluded from this jurisdiction would 
be collective disputes between unions or groups of employées and manage-
ment or employers' associations which should be resolved through collect-
ive bargaining. <21) 
Finally, two other features of the commission's recommendations 
should be noted. First, heavy emphasis is placed on the importance of the 
tribunals' conciliatory functions in dismissal cases with the hope that 
thèse procédures will provide a reasonable and quick settlement of disputes 
on a voluntary basis. Secondly, the report proposes that the Minister of 
Productivity and Employment, following an investigation by the IRC, be 
empowered to exempt satisfactory voluntary dismissal procédures from 
the scope of the statutory machinery. However, no voluntary procédure 
would be exempted unless (para. 560) : 
( i) « it is provided for by collective agreement between parties to 
collective bargaining arrangements and enables joint or indepen-
dent décisions on dismissals to be reached; and 
(ii) it either enables such décisions to be reached before dismissal 
takes effect (thus effectively safeguarding the employée against 
the risk of unfair dismissal) or provides for compensation on 
conditions no less favorable than those laid down in the statute 
as an alternative to reinstatement in the event of a dismissal 
which has taken place being found to be unfair. » 
In my opinion, the législative implementation of thèse recommend-
ations will make an important contribution to public policy in industrial 
relations. As has already been pointed out, studies of trade union govern-
ment in Great Britain provide little évidence of any widespread abuse of 
(21) The commission recommends (paras. 579-580) that the labor tribunals should 
hâve exclusive jurisdiction over cases concerning redundancy pay and unfair dis-
missals, while in ail other matters the plaintiff should hâve the option of instituting 
proceedings before the labor tribunal or in the ordinary courts. However, except 
in extremely complex cases or those involving trial by jury the commission clearly 
intends that most complaints will be heard by the labor tribunals. 
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union power. However, for those kinds of circumstances in which infrin-
gements of union membership rights hâve occurred, the commission's 
recommendations provide ample opportunities for the redress of injustice, 
assuming that the Registrar strictly applies the suggested standards for 
union rules and internai procédures and individual members are willing 
to use the appeals machinery. In addition, the commission's support for 
législation establishing independent appeals machinery for employée dis-
missals also is justified since voluntary efforts to institute adéquate pro-
cédures hâve not been effective in the past and are unlikely to resuit in 
their widespread introduction in the future. 
Thèse recommendations also provide clear examples of two import-
ant principles of the commission's operating philosophy. First, its view 
that the law has a relevant rôle to play in industrial relations, but only 
in those cases in which it can be reasonably expected to be upheld and 
applied effectively. Secondly, there is the principle that even in the con-
text of greater légal intervention, the encouragement of self-government 
in industry and within the labor movement should be given high priority. 
This notion is exemplified specifically in the commission's proposais to 
allow adéquate jointly established dismissals procédures to be exempted 
from the jurisdiction of the statutory appeals machinery and that cases 
concerning membership rights and the problems of union government 
should be considered by a separate tribunal apart from the proposed In-
dustrial Relations Commission, on which only union représentatives 
would sit, in addition to a lawyer as chairman who would represent the 
public interest. In its application of thèse principles, the commission is 
seeking to eradicate the defects of an entirely voluntary industrial relations 
system without at the same time compromising its traditional advantages. 
An acceptance of their relevance in principle does not preclude a 
critical review of the quality of guidance the commission provides for 
the introduction of thèse new policies, however. In particular, the recom-
mendation that the existing industrial tribunals be transformed into multi-
purpose labor tribunals with jurisdiction over « ail disputes arising bet-
ween employers and employées from their contracts of employment > 
raises some interesting questions. For if this recommendation is adopted, 
Great Britain will hâve a full-fledged labor tribunal system, whose 
émergence is the resuit of a séries of piecemeal législative and administ-
rative social policy décisions on a variety of spécifie issues. 
The report does provide a clear and perspective description of the 
proposed functions, character and jurisdiction of the tribunals, but it 
does not discuss in any détail the administrative implications of an extend-
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ed labor tribunal system, apart from noting that it will probably require 
additional tribunal chairman trained both in the law and industrial relations 
and suggesting that « it may be necessary for (the tribunals) to give 
priority to the hearing of dismissal cases in view of their spécial urgency, > 
(para. 548). However, since the existing industrial tribunals hâve been 
in opération for several years, a detailed analysis of their proceedings 
would hâve been valuable in determining their capacity to undertake the 
proposed additional functions. Important information could hâve been 
provided on such issues as the caseload of the tribunals, the length of time 
it takes a case to get on the docket or be decided, the number of cases 
appealed to the courts on points of law and the effect this has on the time 
required for their final resolution, the tribunal's expérience with différent 
kinds of cases, e.g. training levy appeals as compared to redundancy 
payments cases and whether, in circumstances where relevant, the oper-
ating approach of the tribunals has limited or encouraged the flexibility 
necessary for the informai conciliation of disputes. 
Moreover, a detailed review of foreign expérience with labor tribun-
als also would hâve been useful. For example, while the commission 
heard évidence about the French labor courts, a more detailed study of 
this heavily-utilized dispute settlement system, although constitutecl differ-
ently and only specifically relevant to France's industrial relations system, 
could hâve provided insights into the necessary prerequisites for an 
effective system of informai conciliation as well as into the question 
whether separate industry tribunals might make a useful contribution to 
an effective handling of cases which originate in différent industrial cir-
cumstances. (22) In short, while agreeing with the commission^ recom-
mendations in principle, its failure to collect and analyze ail relevant 
empirical data relating to the effective administrative opération of a labor 
tribunal system is another important shortcoming of the report. 
A General Evaluation 
Following this detailed review, what assessment can be made of the 
report as a whole ? As already indicated the report does hâve various 
shortcomings, some of which are inhérent in the procédures utilized by ail 
Royal Commissions. For example, the inordinate length of time which 
was required for the report's completion is not only a resuit of the breadth 
(22) See. Minutes of Evidence 66, witness : G.H. Camerlynck, Professor at the 
Faculty of Law and Economie Sciences, University of Paris, Royal Commission on 
Trade Unions and Employer's Associations, H.M.S.O., London, 1967. 
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and complexity of the commission's task, but also because of the heavy 
commitments or its membership in their regular occupations, Le. to pick 
out only two members at random, Lord Robens is chairman of the Nat-
ional Coal Board and Mr. George Woodcock is gênerai secretary of the 
Trades Union Congress. Moreover, the adversary character of the com-
mission's membership composition meant that compromise retaining the 
characteristics of Britain's traditional industrial relations System was an 
inévitable ingrédient of its délibérations. Finally, in spite of the com-
mission's exhaustive compilation of évidence and the gênerai excellence 
of the study papers produced or commissioned by its research staff, there 
are some important gaps in the report's analysis. For example, the com-
mission's neglect of collective bargaining in the public sector, its limited 
discussion of productivity bargaining (at least in its chapter on the reform 
of collective bargaining) and the failure to provide adéquate empirical 
évidence relevant to the administration of the proposed labor tribunal 
System are some issues that can be singled out in this respect. However, 
even after taking ail thèse criticisms into account, there is no doubt that 
this comprehensive and detailed survey does focus on the key problems 
of British industrial relations and that the report itself, in addition to 
the commission's research papers and published évidence provides excel-
lent source materials for current and future students of Great Britain's 
industrial relations system. 
Moreover, the commission's report represents an important milestone 
in the public review of British industrial relations in at least two respects. 
First, in conjunction with its strong défense of collective bargaining in 
principle, the commission's recommendations for a comprehensive system 
of decentralized plant or companywide agreements gives public approval 
to a structural reorientation of collective bargaining which for at least a 
décade has had the support of many industrial relations académies. And 
in view of the nature of Britain's main labor problems — demoralized 
wage structures and payments Systems, a high incidence of plant level 
industrial conflict and an extensive degree of inefficient manpower utili-
zation — this is clearly a sensible direction for the reform of collective 
bargaining, not withstanding some pitfalls in this approach. <23> Moreover, 
(23) A decentralized bargaining system would clearly pose difficultés for the effec-
tive development of a national incomes policy. For although the commission argues 
that plant agreements could reduce inflationary pressures by achieving a closer link 
between pay and productivity, its proposed decentralized bargaining structures 
would seriously limit the possibility that the central labor market institutions — 
the TUC and CBI — could achieve the power and authority necessary for their 
effective involvement in a national incomes policy. 
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this recommendation points up another important considération, previously 
obscured by the traditional system of industrywide bargaining — that 
company management must face up to its responsibility for the effective 
development of its own industrial relations policies. Secondly, in spite of 
the commission's rejection of legally binding contracts, the report recom-
mends significant changes in Britain's traditional voluntary approach to 
industrial relations. Législative innovations are proposed to regulate intern-
ai unions affairs and to grant employées the right of appeal against unfair 
dismissal. In addition, législation and quasi-legislative approaches also 
are recommended to guarantee workers the right to organize and bargain 
collectively. Finally, and most important, the recommendations requiring 
the registration of collective agreements and providing for the scrutiny of 
industrial relations practices by an independent Industrial Relations Com-
mission guarantees that the conséquences of voluntary collective bargain-
ing will be subject to public review. 
In the final analysis, however, the relevance of the report must be 
judged by the extent to which its recommendations are likely to contribute 
to the urgently needed reform of Britain's collective bargaining institutions 
and procédures. Two considérations are relevant in this respect. First, 
the possible nature and extent of any reform of collective bargaining partly 
dépends on what kind of body the proposed Industrial Relations Com-
mission turns out to be. In turn, this will be determined partly by the 
kind of rôle the government conceives for the commission since the CIR 
will only be able to investigate those cases referred to it by the Minister 
of Employment and Productivity. Equally important, however, will be 
the commission's conception of its own rôle which will be greatly influenced 
by the quality of its chairman and gênerai membership. The expérience 
of the National Board for Priées and Incomes (NBPI), the review body 
set up in 1965 to administer the Labour Government's priées and incomes 
policy, is instructive in this respect. Although like the proposed Industrial 
Relations Commission, the NBPI is not empowered to issue legally binding 
recommendations, it is generally agreed to hâve been a highly successful 
review body. Partly its success can be attributed to favorable public opinion 
and support from the labor movement at the time of its establishment, 
but more particularly it is the resuit of the toughmindedness and critical 
judgement of its chairman and certain key board members as well as the 
gênerai excellence of its research and administrative staff. <24) After more 
than four years of almost continuous économie crisis the public is likely 
(24) See Robert B. McKersie, « The British Board for Priées and Incomes, » 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3, May 1967, pp. 267-84. 
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to be unmoved by or even cynical about the establishment of the new 
industrial relations review body, but even if this is to the government's 
décisions as to its chairman and membership will hâve a considérable 
influence on the IRC's rôle in the reform of collective bargaining. 
Secondly, and by far the most important considération for any wide-
spread reform of collective bargaining, is the extent to which both British 
unions and management voluntarily accept the commission's assumption 
that a formai System of plant bargaining has substantial advantages and 
as a resuit will be prepared to make the necessary institutional changes 
to bring this about. The commission emphasizes the récent expérience 
of productivity bargaining as évidence of the extent to which voluntary 
reform is possible and it looks to the efforts of the Ministry of Employ-
ment and Productivity and the IRC to encourage new approaches to 
collective bargaining in British industry generally. It is unquestionable 
that an implementation of the report's recommendations will encourage 
some degree of the changes needed in British collective bargaining, but it 
is also my belief that the commission's hopeful pragmatic approach greatly 
underestimates the degree of conservative satisfaction with the current 
System and the powerful institutional barriers to its reform. 
In addition, in my view, the commission's optimism also is based 
on a far too limited évaluation of the real costs of the institutional changes 
required to establish plant bargaining on an effective basis. As other 
writers hâve pointed out, together with its support for localized negot-
iations, the commission argues the case for an increased number of union 
officiais, the intégration of shop stewards into the machinery of union 
government and the extension of training at ail levels of the union hierar-
chy, but it never really évaluâtes the overall resource implications of a 
decentralized bargaining system for the unions or faces up to the union's 
obvious difficulties of finding adéquate finances for this purpose. More-
over, the report is almost totally silent on the spécifie implications of 
a decentralized bargaining system for management apart from its critical 
review of managements current personnel policies and of their over-
reliance on employer's associations in the industrial relations field. Never-
theless, comprehensive plant negotiations will demand far-reaching 
changes in the personnel management function, requiring imagination, 
committment, and substantial resources,(25) Therefore based on ail thèse 
considérations, a piecemeal and slow reform of collective bargaining is 
(25) See, for example, D. J. Robertson, "The Implications of the Proposed New Look 
in Industrial Relations," The British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. VI. No. 3, 
November, 1968, pp. 293-95. 
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the only safe prédiction that can be made about possible developments 
in the next few years and it is questionable if this will be adéquate in view 
of the dire circumstances of the British economy. 
The Labour Government's Response: Mrs. Castle's White Paper 
The Donovan report had received a cool réception when it was 
published in June 1968. The Trades Union Congress cautiously welcomed 
the report, the Confédération of British Industry described it as « disap-
pointing •» and one unabashed critic, the influential Economist magazine, 
dismissed the report as « one to forget. ». Nevertheless, the report was 
welcomed by Mrs. Barbara Castle, the Labour Administration's Secretary 
of State for Employment and Productivity, as « valuable and constructive » 
as she committed the Government to the reform of industrial relations, 
including proposais for new législation, as soon as possible after consul-
tations with the Trades Union Congress and the Confédération of British 
Industry. Therefore, whatever its initial réception, the publication of the 
Donovan report and the translation of its major recommendations into law 
will certainly mark a significant turning point in évolution of the Bri-
tish system of industrial relations. 
In January 1969 after more than six months exhaustive discussions 
with the TUC and CBI and extensive debates within the Labour Adminis-
tration, Mrs. Castle presented a White Paper to Parliament which outlined 
the Government's policy for the reform of industrial relations. (26> For the 
purpose of évaluation the Government's proposais will be divided into 
two groups : first, those which more-or-less faithfully follow the views of 
the Donovan report; and secondly, those more contentious proposais 
which go beyond the Royal Commission's recommendations, especially 
those which propose modest limitations on the right to strike. 
No more than a cursory reading of the White Paper is required to 
détermine that the Government completely accepts the Royal Com-
mission's basic philosophy and its diagnosis of and prescriptions for Bri-
tain's industrial relations problems. This can be seen in a review of the 
White Paper's major propositions and arguments. First, it agrées with the 
Donovan report that while at its best the présent system of industrial 
relations works well, it still has « serious (gênerai) deficiencies — both 
from the point of view of the community and the individu al employée » 
(2fi) In Place of Strije : A Policy for Industrial Relations, Cmnd. 3888, H.M.S.O., 
London, January, 1969. The numbers inserted after quotations in the text refer to 
paragraph numbers in the White Paper. 
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(para. 13). Secondly, the White Paper follows the Royal Commission's 
distinction between formai and informai Systems of collective bargaining, 
agreeing that « in practice an increasing amount of bargaining and an 
increasing proportion of the wage packet is settled outside the 'formai 
system' by informai understandings and arrangements between shop stew-
ards and managers or foremen at workplace level » (para. 20). And it 
then goes on to argue that this concentration on informality créâtes serious 
problems such as : the lack of clear principles to settle shop floor griev-
ances and comprehensive, mutually agreed procédures whose absence 
encourages arbitrary behavior by management and wildcat strikes (paras. 
20 and 22). Finally, and « most important of ail the disparity between 
the formai System and the realities of shop floor life is often not fully ap-
preciated or even understood by senior management in the companies 
where it occurs, « while.. .» on the union side many national leaders 
continue to uphold the assumptions of increasingly ineffectuai industry-
wide negotiating structures » (para. 23 ). 
Thirdly, although the White Paper expresses doubts about the relev-
ance of such arrangements in ail industries, it agrées with the Royal 
Commission's view that « the best way forward will often be the negot-
iation of formai, comprehensive and authoritative company or factory 
agreements » (para. 27). In addition, it singles out management as the 
major source of initiatives for change and it accepts the Donovan report's 
principles for satisfactory company or factory agreements, (see footnote 
six above). Fourthly, the Government completely accepts Donovan's géné-
ral arguments against making collective agreements legally enforceable con-
tracts, although it proposes changes in the law to remove any impediments 
« to the légal observance of collective agreements negotiated between 
employers or employers' associations and trade unions by any method 
freely decided upon by the two parties » (paras. 42-46). Finally, the 
Government's policy statement unequivocably signais — and in stronger 
terms than stated by the Royal Commission — an end to Britain's tra-
ditional laissez faire approach to industrial relations for the White Paper's 
philosophy assumes that the state has a direct and major part to play 
in regulating industrial relations. In short, for the first time it introduces 
as a generalized principle, the concept that in industrial relations both 
sides of industry hâve responsibilities to the community at large, (see 
Paras. 5-9). 
In applying thèse principles to achieve a concrète reform of industrial 
relations, the White Paper then goes on to propose the introduction of 
new industrial relations législation which will include inter alla nine major 
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groups of recommendations, ail of which closely follow the Royal Com-
mission's report : ^7) 
1. The establishment of a Commission on Industrial Relations (C1R) 
with a full-time chairman and members. The CIR will be charged 
with the task of improving and extending effective industrial re-
lations procédures in British industry and to make reports on référ-
ences to it by the Secretary of State for Employment and Produet-
ivity concerning particular industrial problems such as union 
demands for récognition, the reform of trade union structure or 
the lack of satisfactory agreements or procédures in a particular 
industry or section of an industry. However, the CIR will not be 
empowered to issue legally binding recommendations since it is 
intended to be « a disseminator of good (industrial relations) prac-
tice and a focus for reform by example » (para. 37). 
2. The introduction of initially voluntary, but ultimately statutory 
requirements that compagnies with 5000 or more employées register 
substantive and procédural agreements, plus arrangements for con-
sultation concerning matters not covered by negotiations with the 
Department of Employment and Productivity. In appropriate cases 
smaller firms will be asked for information about their agreements. 
Spécial attention will be paid to firms with « nil » returns and 
those with seriously inadéquate procédural agreements. 
3. The White Paper accepts the need for the extension of trade 
unionism and collective bargaining in British industry. This goal 
is to be achieved through recommendations in this and the next 
two sections. In the first place, the principle that no employer bas 
the right to prevent or obstruct an employée from belonging to a 
trade union will be guaranteed under the law. Moreover, no Frien-
dly Society will be allowed to hâve raies debarring trade unionists 
from membership. Employées will also hâve redress under the law 
if they are dismissed on account of trade union membership. 
(27) The White Paper does include a variety of other recommendations, many of 
which deal with technical points of law. Nevertheless, among other significant re-
commendations were : proposais that employers be legally required to disclose 
relevant information to unions in the course of consultation or negotiations, plus 
favorable support for experiments in worker représentation on the boards of com-
panies with a possible view to considering législation for such arrangements if 
this proves désirable. However, as is the case generally in the White Paper, the 
Government follows the Donovan report in emphasizing that a gênerai reform of 
collective bargaining is the best approach for dealing with restrictive labor practices 
and improvements in industrial training. In fact, the Government rejects only two 
of the Royal Commission's recommendations : that trade unions should be given 
corporate status (paras. 111); and that the légal protection for inducing breaches 
of contract as provided under the Trades Disputes Acts of 1906 and 1965 should 
be limited to registered trade unions or those individuals acting on their behalf, 
thus making unofficial strikers liable under the law (para. 88). 
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4. In disputes in which an employer refuses to recognize a union, 
recognizes some unions, but not others or recognizes, but refuses 
to negotiate with a union, the Government will be legally empower-
ed to refer such cases to the CIR for investigation and a report. If 
the union is appropriate and can establish that it has reasonable 
support as determined in a ballot or through other procédures, 
the CIR will be expected to favor récognition. In cases in which an 
employer refuses to recognize a union even after a recommendation 
by the CIR or recognizes a union, but refuses to bargain genuinely 
with it, the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity 
will be empowered to issue an Order requiring that the employer 
recognize and/or negotiate with the union. After this, if the em-
ployer continues his opposition, the union will be granted the right 
of unilatéral arbitration before the Industrial Court, whose awards 
will be legally binding. (28) 
5. In inter-union disputes over récognition the Government proposes 
that the CIR will bring pressure to bear on the unions involved 
to reach a settlement. If thèse efforts fail, the Government will ask 
the TUC to résolve the dispute, but if a settlement is not possible 
within a reasonable time, the case will be formally referred to 
the CIR which in certain circumstances may hâve to recommend 
that only a certain union be recognized. In thèse cases the Govern-
ment expects that ail parties concerned will accept the CIR's re-
commendations, but if they do not, the Secretary of State for Em-
ployment and Productivity will be empowered to issue an Order to 
give effect to the CIR's recommendations. An employer or union 
which then refused to honor the CIR's recommendations would be 
liable to financial penalties. (29> 
(28) It should be noted that like the Donovan report the White Paper fails to provide 
the CIR with detailed guidance on how to détermine whether a union is appropriate 
or has established reasonable support. Moreover, the Government's proposais 
to allow unions' access to unilatéral arbitration in cases in which it has obtained 
récognition, but the employer concerned refuses to bargain genuinely raise the same 
difficult questions as the Royal Commission's similar recommendations. Either 
the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity will hâve to décide whether 
an employer is « bargaining in good f aith » or it may be assumed that such a f ailure 
simply exists in ail cases in which a refusai to negotiate occurs. If the latter approach 
is adopted, then the Industrial Court will hâve the burden of both determining 
whether the employer is « bargaining in good f aith » as well as the acceptible range 
of bargainable issues. And this could, indeed, resuit in a dramatic change in the 
Industrial Court's traditional function as a dispute settlement tribunal. 
(29) In this proposai the Government obviously is looking to the TUC to play a 
much more positive rôle in settling inter-union disputes than it has undertaken in 
the past. However, the TUC's reluctance to take a positive position in the current 
serious white collar inter-union récognition dispute in the steel industry raises 
some doubts about the gênerai effectiveness of its rôle in this capacity. Nevertheless, 
the White Paper does go further than the Donovan report in recommending in the 
final analysis an imposed settlement of inter-union récognition disputes by the CIR, 
whose recommendations ultimately could be supported by financial penalties. 
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6. The establishment of a new Industrial Board whose jurisdictîon 
would be : cases arising out of refusais to honor Government 
Orders giving effect to CIR recommendations in inter-union ré-
cognition disputes and, as indicated below, cases concerning com-
plaints against trade unions by individuals, the registration of 
trade unions, or « conciliation pauses » and strike ballots. The 
membership of the Board will be made up of individuals selected 
from the employer and employée panels of the tripartite Industrial 
Court and it will sit under the chairmanship of the Court's Président 
or one of its independent légal members; however, the précise 
composition of the Board's membership will dépend on the nature 
of the case under review (see section nine below). The Board will 
be empowered to impose financial penalties on an employer, union 
or individual striker. However, attachment of earnings, not impri-
sonment, will be the ultimate sanction applied in the event of 
default of payment or failure to obey an Order by the Secretary 
of State for Employment and Productivity. 
7. Statutory machinery will be established to safeguard workers 
against unfair dismissal. The Industrial Relations Bill will pro-
vide that dismissal is justified only if there is a valid reason for 
it connected with the capacity or conduct of the employée or based 
on the operational requirements of the firm; in the absence of 
such valid reasons dismissals will be considered unfair. Employées 
who consider themselves to hâve been unfairly dismissed, including 
those individuals who are discharged for refusing to join a union 
in a closed shop situation, will hâve the right of complaint to the 
currently operative Industrial Tribunals. The White Paper accepts 
the Royal Commission's view that thèse tribunals should be 
empowered to hear dismissal cases and that their ultimate juris-
diction should be expanded to cover ail légal disputes (except for 
those about accidents at work) arising from individual contracts 
of employment and statutory claims between employers and em-
ployées. Compensation or reinstatement may be awarded by the 
Tribunals in the event of an unfair dismissal being proved. However, 
the spécifie form of the statutory procédures and the extent to which 
voluntary dismissal procédures may be exempted from them will be 
the subject of further discussions between the Government and both 
sides of industry. 
8. A new post — a Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers' Asso-
ciations — will be established. Trade unions will be required to 
hâve rules governing certain matters (e.g. admissions, discipline, 
disputes between the union and its members, élections, strike 
ballots and the apointment and functions of shop stewards) and to 
register, together with ail employers associations, with the new 
Registrar within a prescribed period. Refusais to introduce ap-
propriate rules within a reasonable time period or to register will 
lay a trade union open to financial penalties assessed by the In-
dustrial Board (see section six above). The Registrar will hâve 
the right to challenge union rules and to deny registration if the 
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specified subjects are not adequately covered. Unions and em-
ployers' associations will hâve the right of appeal to the Industrial 
Court against the Registrar's décision not to register them. 
9. Safeguards for union members will be introduced. Complaints 
against trade unions by individuals who hâve no access to, or hâve 
exhausted their union's internai appeal procédures will be con-
sidered initially by the Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers' 
Associations who will seek to promote amicable settlements. How-
ever, complaints of unfair or arbitrary action by trade unions 
resulting in substantial injustice may be ultimately referred to the 
Industrial Board (see section six above). If the complaints are 
found to be justified, the Board will be empowered to award da-
mages or to require an individual's admission to or reinstatement 
in a union. In cases of this kind the Board's membership will be 
composed of a légal independent member of the Industrial Court 
as chairman and two members of the employées panel of the 
Court. 
The reaction of the TUC and CBI to thèse proposais was predictable 
largely because their responses closely followed the propositions developed 
in their évidence submitted to the Royal Commission and in discussions 
with the Government during the last half of 1968. Both organizations 
agreed with the proposed rôle of the CIR as a body which would seek 
to reform industrial relations not by issuing legally binding recommen-
dations, but by voluntary methods of persuasion and good example. More-
over, they jointly agreed that negotiating procédures were in drastic need 
of reform, although both bodies expressed misgivings that an extrême 
decentralization of collective bargaining might not be the best policy in 
ail industries. In line with thèse views and as a modest first step toward 
voluntary reform, late in 1968 the TUC and CBI jointly agreed to under-
take a critical évaluation of collective bargaining procédures on an industry 
by industry basis; and in January 1969 the TUC announced its own 
intentions to establish new national joint bargaining councils in various 
industries which on the union side would be serviced by secretariates of 
full-time officiais and teams of trade union « trouble-shooters » to assist 
individual unions in setting up organizational and procédural arrange-
ments for effective local negotiations. 
Fundamental disagreements between the two organizations remained, 
however. In particular, the CBI reiterated its view that the Government 
had passed up an excellent opportunity to achieve an effective reform of 
industrial relations by not making collective agreements legally enforceable 
contracts. For its part, the TUC reaffirmed its resolute opposition to such 
proposais on the grounds that they were both « impractical and undesir-
able. » Moreover, in line with its gênerai support for a voluntary approach 
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to reform, the TUC also pressed strongly for arrangements under which 
it, rather than an independent review body, would be the institution which 
would consider individual members' grievances against their unions. As 
noted above, this approach was not adopted in the White Paper, but it is 
likely that the TUC will continue to pressure the Government to change 
its mind on this issue prior to the actual submission of the proposais for 
new industrial relations législation to Parliament.(30) 
The most controversial élément in the White Paper, of course, was 
the extent to which the Labour Government was prepared to go further 
that the Royal Commission^ recommendations, in particular its pro-
posais for limitations on the right to strike in certain circumstances. While 
the White Paper firmly rejects the introduction of legally enforceable 
labor contracts as a gênerai solution to Britain's strike problems, the 
Wilson Administration in gênerai and Mrs. Barbara Castle in particular 
hâve accepted the view that strikes, especially those occurring without 
prior use of existing dispute settlement procédures, must not be allowed 
to impose unlimited serious costs on an increasingly interdependent econ-
omy which relies heavily on foreign trade. And during the Autumn of 
1968 support for this view was dramatically provided by a potentially 
disastrous national engineering strike which was called — off at the last 
minute and a séries of serious unofficial strikes in the export important 
automobile industry, plus increasingly strident demands by the Conserv-
ative Opposition that the Government introduce restrictions on the right 
to strike and growing évidence that the gênerai public as well as trade 
union members would support a tougher line with the unions, including 
anti-strike législation. (31> 
Therefore, late in 1968 with strong support from both the Prime 
Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mrs. Castle recommended 
the introduction of new législation, supported by financial penalties, which 
would empower the Government to require unions to conduct strike ballots 
or agrée to « conciliation pauses » in cases where major officiai or serious 
(30) See The Financial Times, October 11 and 24, 1968; November 7 and 8, 1968; 
and January 13, 1969. 
(31) For example, see The Observer (London), December 1, 1968 for proposais by 
Mr. Edward Heath, Leader of the Conservative Opposition, that a 90 day cooling-
off period be instituted for industrial disputes, that inter-union disputes be declared 
illégal and that collective agreements be made into legally binding contracts. More-
over, in The Sunday Times (of London) for January 5, 1969, the results of an 
independent Opinion Research Centre survey of trade union members were publish-
ed which appeared to show substantial support for restrictive labor législation, 
including the introduction of legally binding contracts. 
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unofficial strikes were threatened. In spite of this high ranking ministerial 
support, thèse proposais met vigorous opposition in a séries of lengthy 
cabinet meetings which were conducted against a background of rumblings 
of discontent among and threatened opposition by back bench trade union 
and left-wing Labour MPs. <32) While the appearance of thèse proposais as 
agreed Government policy in the White Paper is clearly a victory for 
Mrs. Castle, the timing of the introduction of this controversial législation 
remains a key and as yet unresolved issue facing the Government. If as 
appears likely, its introduction is postponed to the next parliamentary 
session, the next six months may provide opportunities for a more effect-
ive opposition to the proposais to be formed within the Party and in any 
event with the necessity to hold a General Election no later than 1971, 
the Government may then hâve second thoughts about antagonizing the 
unions, its major source of campaign finance. 
With regard to strikes, the White Paper specifically makes three 
gênerai recommendations. First, a more active dispute settlement rôle 
is proposed for the conciliation officers of the Department of Employment 
and Productivity. Conciliation officers will be directed to be more ready 
to intervene in industrial disputes without waiting for the invitation of the 
parties, especially in cases in which existing procédures are defective and 
are likely to hinder, rather than encourage a settlement. Moreover, in 
various disputes where appropnate the Government proposes to appoint 
independent chairmen to existing negotiating structures and to hâve con-
ciliation officers singly or jointly with management and union représent-
atives conduct informai investigations into disputes to avert strikes and 
to promote settlements. Ail of thèse approaches are to be exercised flexibly 
so as not to prevent the effective opération of voluntary procédures (paras. 
83-85). 
Secondly, in response to Britain's serious problem of unofficial and 
unconstitutional strikes which occur in breach of procédure and without 
the officiai authorization of the unions concerned, the Government pro-
poses to grant the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity 
reserve discretionary powers to introduce a « conciliation pause » in strikes 
of this kind which are likely to hâve serious conséquences. Thèse powers 
would only be used after normal conciliations procédures had failed and 
(S2) One leading senior ministerial opponent of the proposais was the Home Secre-
tary, Mr. James Callaghan, who Whitehall observers suggested among other reasons 
was fearful of the négative impact of the anti-strike législation on Party morale 
as well as on the willingness of the unions to make increased contributions to the 
Labour Party's coffers, an issue which as Party treasurer he is directly concerned. 
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in the event of a strike occuring as a resuit of a change in work practices 
which had not been preceded by appropriate notice and consultation, the 
Management concerned will be required to withdraw the new arrangements 
and préserve the statu quo as a precondition to securing a return to 
work. However, in spite of additional ministry initiatives to reach a settle-
ment, including spécial investigations in instances in which current pro-
cédures prove to be inadéquate, if the strike went ahead, then the Secretary 
of State would be empowered to issue an Order requiring a return to 
work, a ban on further industrial action for 28 days and a restoration of 
the statu quo concerning ail terms and conditions of employment which 
existed prior to the dispute. If either party failed to comply with the Order, 
they would be liable to financial penalties imposed at the discrétion of 
the Industrial Board. Although after the expiration of the « conciliation 
pause » strikes or lock-outs could take place, the Government expects 
the TUC and the unions involved to use their best initiatives to guarantee 
compliance with the Order s and to see that procédures are followed (paras. 
93-96). 
Finally, in situations in which major officiai strikes are threatened 
the Government proposes to empower the Secretary of State to persuade 
the unions involved to conduct a ballot of their memberships before strike 
action is taken. Moreover, a strike ballot will be required at the discrétion 
of the Secretary of State in cases in which the unions refuse to agrée to 
this request and industrial action is considered to pose a serious threat 
to the economy or the public interest. However, apart from giving approval 
to the form of the question to be put to the vote, the Secretary of State 
will not intervene in the ballot which will be conducted according to the 
rules of the unions concerned as approved by the Registrar of Trade 
Unions and Employers' Associations. The White Paper takes pains to 
point out that the object of thèse recommendations « will not be to place 
a prohibition on such strikes, but to help ensure that before strikes of 
this importance take place the union members themselves are convinced 
that they are right to go on strike. » (paras. 97-98). 
If last July's réception of the Donovan report was « cool, » then the 
response to the Government's anti-strike proposais must be termed as 
« frigid. » The TUC strongly reiterated its traditional opposition to 
strike législation in any form and in this it was joined by the powerful 
Transport and General Workers' Union. On the other hand, both the 
CBI and the Conservative Opposition attacked the White Paper as having 
« failed miserably » to deal with the problem of unofficial strikes. More-
over, a common view in many circles was that in seeking to modify both 
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the unions and her opponents in the Labour Party, Mrs. Castle had at the 
same time managed to antagonize the proponents of voluntary industrial 
relations reform, while not going far enough to satisfy those groups who 
had pressed for more far-reaching législative changes. 
In my opinion, a more balanced évaluation of the White Paper's 
anti-strike proposais is that while providing the Government with a more 
flexible arsenal of weapons to deal with industrial disputes, they do not 
fundamentally go beyond the Donovan report's support for an essentially 
voluntary approach to the reform of industrial relations. This is because 
it is likely that thèse new procédures may only hâve limited applicability. 
For example, the strike ballot proposai may hâve some use in bringing 
rank and file membership opinion to bear on their national leadership or 
in providing union officiais with a way out of misguided strike situations, 
but in gênerai as the Government itself realizes, foreign expérience with 
such procédures has not been overwhelmingly successful. In the United 
States, for example, in most cases strike ballot requirements hâve served 
merely to encourage a more militant posture by the rank and file and to 
force the national union leadership into inflexible bargaining positions. 
Moreover, since Britain's major strike problem is with unofficial plant 
level stoppages, a procédure only dealing with national officiai strikes 
will necessarily be of limited use. 
The introduction of « conciliation pauses » to deal with unofficial 
strikes in breach of procédure also poses a number of problems. In many 
instances workers will already be on strike before the procédure can be 
invoked and in some cases the Government will hâve to be prepared to 
face up to the fact that financial penalties may hâve to be assessed against 
a significant number of determined strikers. Moreover, since the final dé-
cision to use both of the proposed procédures rests with the Secretary 
of State for Employment and Productivity, substantial political pressures 
not to put them into effect are likely to become a regular ingrédient of 
negotiations between the unions and the Government. In the final analysis, 
therefore, while thèse proposais mark a significant change in public policy 
toward industrial disputes, it is unlikely that they will fundamentally alter 
the character of Britain's traditional voluntary System. 
The White Paper goes beyond the Royal Commission's recommen-
dations in one other important respect. This is with regard to the reform 
of trade union structure and organization. Like the Donovan report the 
Government accepts the need for far-reaching reforms, including union 
amalgamations, an increased number of full-time officiais, improved 
finances and better internai communications. In particular, the White 
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Paper focuses on the need to eradicate the disadvantages of multi-unionism 
through the unions' acceptance of « the criterion of one union for one 
grade of work within a factory » wherever possible and the establishment 
of officiai joint union councils at the workplace level (para. 69). It also 
emphasizes that the basic reforms must corne from the unions themselves, 
but indicates that the CIR will be receiving références on problems of 
trade union structure and organization. 
Beyond this, however, the White Paper argues that the Royal Com-
mission does not go far enough in its recommendations for the modern-
ization of the labor movement. Therefore, it proposes the establishment 
of a Trade Union Development Scheme through which public funds would 
be provided under the auspices of the CIR to directly assist unions who 
apply for grants justifiable purposes including, for example, an expan-
sion of training or research activities, the employment of management 
consultants or assistance in union mergers. The Government also goes 
on to make a gênerai committment to provide additional resources both 
directly and indirectly for an expansion of industrial relations training and 
éducation for union and management officiais at ail levels (paras. 71-78). 
This is, indeed, an imaginative, if somewhat bizarre proposai. Never-
theless, while the idea of a Trade Union Development Scheme carries 
with it a faint order of a corporate state mentality, despite the Govern-
ment's assurances that the scheme would be both limited and voluntary 
with no attempts to use it to influence union bargaining policies, the 
White Paper — far more realistically than the Royal Commission — does 
face up to the resource implications of a comprehensive System of plant 
bargaining. However, while the existence of such a scheme, together with 
CIR and other Government initiatives, cannot help but to speed up the 
pace of trade union reform, the major initiatives still must corne from 
within the labor movement. And the extent to which the unions respond 
to this challenge, as the TUC's cool réception to the Trade Union Develop-
ment Scheme makes clear, will dépend on much more than the gênerai 
availability of adéquate finance alone, but also on their willingness to 
accept the need for structural reform and to put new programs and policies 
into effect. <33> 
(33) The TUC's immédiate reaction to the Trade Union Development scheme was 
to argue that « expérience gives no ground for believing that financial problems 
are a significant obstacle to amalgamation or that trade unionists are unwilling to 
recognize the need to increase contributions where executives can show that this 
is needed to improve such services as training, éducation and research. » See 
The Financial Time, January 18, 1969. 
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In the final analysis, however, I would argue that neither of the 
Government's new proposais negate its overwhelming acceptance of the 
Royal Commission's philosophy and approach to industrial relations 
reform. As a resuit, the White Paper's gênerai strong points and weak-
nesses are the same as those of the Royal Commission's report. And since 
the Donovan report has already been evaluated in détail, there is no use 
in reviewing them again. In short, the same gênerai conclusion must be 
reached : the impact of the Government's proposais alone is likely to 
provide only a modest encouragement to the pace and extent of industrial 
relations reform. 
However, as noted earlier the membership and operating philosophy 
of the CIR, which together with the publication of the White Paper the 
Government established as a Royal Commission to enable it to begin 
work immediately, are likely to be crucial variables, in its ultimate impact 
as an agent of industrial relations reform. In this regard the Government's 
appointment, although not without some reported misgivings, of Mr. 
George Woodcock, the gênerai secretary of the TUC, as the CIR's full-
time chairman, together with the sélection of Mr. Allan Flanders of 
Nuffield Collège, Oxford; Mr. Leslie Blakeman, the Industrial Relations 
Director of the Ford Motor Company; and Mr. Will Paynter, the ex-
communist retired gênerai secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers 
as full-time members are likely to hâve important conséquences for the 
commission's operating philosophy and approach. While ail the appointées 
are generally respected for their knowledge in the field of industrial 
relations, it is well known that, in particular, both Mr. Woodcock and 
Mr. Flanders strongly hold the view that effective collective bargaining 
reforms can only be achieved by voluntary methods of persuasion and 
good example. An unless their on-the-job expérience leads them to aban-
don this view, the efforts of thèse two key members of the commission 
are likely to produce important, but generally evolutionary and long run 
reforms in British collective bargaining practices and procédures. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that further législative intervention 
in British industrial relations is by no means a closed option in spite of 
the Labour Administration's gênerai rejection of legally binding agree-
ments. As already pointed out, the Royal Commission itself repeatedly 
issued Cassandralike warnings in its report that the introduction of legally 
binding agreements may be necessary if reform cannot be achieved by 
voluntary means and based on its approach to the strike problem adopted 
in its White Paper, the Labour Administration may in time corne around to 
this view itself. Moreover, with Labour's political popularity decidedly 
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on the wane, it is important to take account of the Conservative Oppo-
sition^ policy position on industrial relations reform. In a policy document 
issued in April 1968 the Conservatives accept in much the same way as 
the Royal Commission the need for strong unions and effective collective 
bargaining, but argue that thèse changes can only be achieved within a 
new législative framework, which would include, inter alla, legally binding 
agreements, restrictions on strike action of certain kinds, particularly on 
strikes which would seriously damage the economy and a more vigorous 
approach to the eradication of restrictive practices and the achievement 
of improved manpower utilization. <**> And during the last year the Con-
servatives hâve made it clear that they hâve every intention of translating 
their proposais into law if they are returned as Her Majesty's Government 
in the next General Election. 
There can now be no answer to the question of whether the pu-
blication of the Donovan report and Mrs. Castle's White Paper marks 
the end to the public policy debate over British industrial relations or 
whether they are merely a prélude to new proposais and additional re-
forms. Only the expérience of the next few year s will provide an answer to 
this question; and this is likely to dépend on the outcome of a. variety 
of future impondérables : Britain's short-term économie situation, the 
Labour Party's view of the importance of industrial relations reform as 
an électoral issue together with its political fortunes in the next General 
Election and, most important, the willingness of British unions and 
management to voluntarily face up to the need for a drastic reform of 
collective bargaining. However, in this writer's opinion the Donovan report 
and Labour's White Paper are only a beginning with further Government 
intervention in industrial relations in the next five years a strong likelihood. 
LA RÉFORME DES RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES EN 
GRANDE BRETAGNE 
Le système de négociation collective volontaire britannique ainsi que le rôle 
du mouvement syndical dans la société contemporaine ont été extrêmement cri-
tiqués depuis le milieu des années 1950. Dans la décennie suivante, alors que les 
problèmes économiques britanniques devenaient de plus en plus sérieux, ce mou-
vement de critique s'est accru pour finalement amener, en 1964, le gouvernement 
(**) See the Conservative Political Centre, Fair Deal at Work : The Conservative 
Approach to Modem Industrial Relations, London, April 1968. The proposais for 
union récognition and for dealing with national emergency disputes are very similar 
to the approaches provided in the United States under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley 
Acts. 
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travailliste, nouvellement au pouvoir, à former la « Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions and Employers' Associations » sous la présidence du juge Donovan. Son 
mandat expliquait qu'il devait étudier le système britannique de relations indus-
trielles. Pour faire suite à la publication du rapport de cette commission en juin 
1968, le gouvernement travailliste présenta au Parlement, en janvier 1969, un Livre 
Blanc sur ses projets de réforme pour le système de relations industrielles. 
Dans un premier temps, nous tenterons une revue critique des principales 
recommandations et conclusions de la Commission en insistant sur trois champs 
spécifiques de problèmes : la réforme de la négociation collective, son extension 
à l'industrie britannique et la protection des droits à l'individu tant employé 
qu'employeur. Dans un second temps, nous espérons pouvoir présenter une éva-
luation globale de ce rapport ainsi qu'une revue des projets de réforme du gou-
vernement travailliste et de l'opposition conservatrice. 
LA RÉFORME DE LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
Le but principal du rapport Donovan est d'examiner les défauts du présent 
système britannique de négociation collective et de proposer des réformes. En 
plus d'être d'accord avec le système de négociation collective volontaire, Lord 
Donovan propose qu'il soit étendu à toute l'industrie britannique. Il critique ce-
pendant très fortement le système traditionnel de négociation à l'échelle de l'indus-
trie et note l'existence d'un système informel de négociations locales créé par le 
comportement des syndicats, des associations d'employeurs, des cadres, des délé-
gués de département et des travailleurs. 
La Commission réclame la fin de ce conflit entre cette prétendue négociation 
au niveau de l'industrie et la réalité des relations industrielles. Plus spécifiquement, 
elle propose l'adoption d'un système de négociations collectives décentralisées, 
impliquant la signature d'ententes compréhensives au niveau de la compagnie ou 
de la firme. 
LE RÔLE DES POLITIQUES GOUVERNEMENTALES 
L'approche de la Commission pour réaliser cette réforme de la négociation 
collective se résume en une revue publique des pratiques et procédures actuelles 
et ce afin de faire des recommandations sur les changements à apporter. À cette fin, 
la Commission propose une nouvelle loi des relations industrielles qui exigerait que 
toute firme de cinq mille employés ou plus enregistre ses conventions collectives 
au « Department of Employment and Productivity » et qui établirait une Com-
mission permanente de relations industrielles (CIR). Le CIR serait chargé d'enquêter 
sur les cas que le gouvernement lui transmettrait au sujet de la non-reconnaissance 
de syndicats, du manque de certains accords à respecter les minima établis et d'autres 
problèmes de relations industrielles. Vu que cette approche encourage une réforme 
volontaire des relations du travail, la Commission ne donne pas force de loi aux 
recommandations du CIR. 
LE REJET DES SANCTIONS LÉGALES 
Faisant suite à de nombreux débats internes et à la publication d'un rapport 
minoritaire, la Commission rejette l'idée de transformer la convention collective en 
contrats à obligations légales. La raison principale de cette objection est que, 
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selon eux, la cause réelle du problème officieux de la grève en Grande-Bretagne 
se retrouve dans les méthodes actuelles de négociations collectives et surtout dans 
les méthodes de négociations locales caractérisées par l'absence de procédures 
claires et rapides de règlement des conflits. En plus, les conventions à force légale 
ne seraient pas une contribution valable à l'atteinte des réformes dont ce pays 
a besoin. 
QUELQUES REMARQUES SUR LA RÉFORME DE LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
Nous croyons que, d'une façon générale, les recommandations de la Commis-
sion sont pertinentes. La tendance à un système décentralisé de négociation col-
lective est appropriée autant pour des raisons pratiques que pragmatiques. De 
plus son argumentation contre les conventions à force légale est justifiable. Néan-
moins, l'approche essentiellement volontaire de la Commission aux réformes à 
entreprendre signifie que les changements aux procédures de négociation collective 
seront nécessairement lents et fragmentaires. À cet effet, la Commission se trompe 
en considérant la présente signification de la négociation sur la productivité comme 
preuve que les syndicats et les patrons vont entreprendre les réformes d'une façon 
volontaire. Cette erreur est due au fait que la Commission n'a pas réalisé les exi-
gences de cette approche pour les parties. En plus, la Commission sous-estime les 
conséquences de certaines de ses recommandations encourageant une plus grande 
utilisation de négociations locales inflationnistes et chaotiques et, d'une façon géné-
rale, ignore, dans son rapport, les problèmes posés par la négociation collective 
dans le secteur public. 
L'EXTENTION DE LA NEGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
La Commission appuie fortement l'extension de la négociation collective à 
l'industrie britannique en proposant la suppression de plusieurs obstacles tradi-
tionnels à la reconnaissance syndicale, barrières qui ont été importantes surtout 
dans le domaine de l'organisation des cols blancs. Elle recommande, en premier 
lieu, que le droit au membership syndical soit positivement protégé par la loi. Elle 
propose ensuite d'adopter certains changements dans le système des « Wages 
council » afin d'encourager la négociation collective libre : en cas de refus de 
reconnaissance syndicale par la partie patronale, le gouvernement aura le pouvoir 
de référer le cas au CIR pour examen et rapport. Suivant sa philosophie de réforme 
volontaire, la Commission ne recommande pas que les propositions du CIR aient 
force de loi. Cependant, lorsqu'un employeur persiste à refuser de reconnaître un 
syndicat ou ne négocie pas réellement, le gouvernement peut permettre au syndicat 
concerné d'avoir recours à l'arbitrage unilatéral par l'« Industrial Court ». 
Ces recommandations auront probablement de très grandes implications sur 
le système britannique de relations industrielles. Notre divergence de vue avec les 
membres de la Commission n'a pas comme cause certaines recommandations spé-
cifiques, mais plutôt la valeur de l'orientation qu'elles donnent pour développement 
de la politique gouvernementale en ce domaine. 
La Commission était consciente des difficultés pratiques d'application de 
critères spécifiques pour la reconnaissance syndicale et nous croyons qu'elle est 
correcte en proposant au CIR d'adopter une approche très flexible. Néanmoins, une 
des grandes faiblesses du rapport est de n'avoir pas inclus une évaluation générale 
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des différents principes et critères de reconnaissance. En plus, on peut reprocher 
à la Commission de ne pas avoir proposé que les fonctions du CIR soient utilisées 
dans le but de réaliser une structure syndicale plus rationnelle au niveau de 
l'entreprise. En dernier lieu, en permettant au syndicat l'utilisation d'arbitrage unila-
téral en cas de refus de négociation réelle, la Commission ne définit pas la façon 
de déterminer si un employeur négocie de « bonne foi » ou non. 
LA PROTECTION DES DROITS DES SYNDIQUÉS ET DES EMPLOYÉS 
La Commission recommande également que les droits des syndiqués devraient 
être protégés de la façon suivante : en cas d'injustice criante, les individus devraient 
avoir le droit de faire appel à un tribunal indépendant ayant les pouvoirs de rendre 
une sentence sur la compensation à verser ou sur d'autres moyens susceptibles de 
punir l'employeur en cause. En plus, on exigerait des syndicats d'enregistrer cer-
tains règlements chez le « Chief Registrar of Trade Union and Employers' Asso-
ciations ». Les employés individuels auront également droit d'appel sur les congé-
diements injustes devant les « Industrial Tribunals » dont on est censé étendre la 
juridiction au point qu'ils puissent s'occuper de ces cas ainsi que tout conflit 
(à l'exception des conflits collectifs et de ceux qui peuvent provenir des accidents 
du travail) entre employeurs et employés. 
Même si on fit peu de publicité autour de ces recommandations lors de la 
publication du rapport, elles auront probablement une grande influence sur les 
relations industrielles britanniques. Cependant, avant de proposer que les tribunaux 
industriels actuels soient transformés en cours de travail à plusieurs utilités, une 
évaluation détaillée de la façon dont opère ces tribunaux et un regard sur les expé-
riences étrangères à ce sujet sembleraient avoir été nécessaires. La Commission 
ne fait pas une telle évaluation dans son rapport. 
UNE ÉVALUATION GÉNÉRALE 
En dépit d'un certain nombre de faiblesses, le rapport de la Commission royale 
est une contribution importante au débat sur la politique gouvernementale et sur 
les réformes à apporter au système de relations industrielles britanniques. Ses re-
commandations aboutissent à un changement significatif dans l'approche britan-
nique traditionnellement volontaire aux relations du travail. En plus, son appui à 
un système plus décentralisé de négociation collective donne une approbation pu-
blique à la réorientation structurelle de la négociation collective depuis longtemps 
prônée par plusieurs académiciens en relations industrielles. Cependant, le succès 
de ses recommandations dépend en partie de l'approche empruntée par le CIR 
et plus particulièrement sur la volonté des syndicats et des employeurs britanniques 
à prendre part à la réforme volontaire. En guise d'observation générale, disons 
que la Commission a sous-estimé le degré de satisfaction conservatrice face au 
système actuel de négociation collective. Cela signifie qu'on peut s'attendre, dans 
les prochaines années, à une approche lente et fragmentaire à la réforme. 
LA RÉPONSE DU GOUVERNEMENT TRAVAILLISTE : LE LIVRE BLANC DE MME CASTLE 
Après plus de six mois de discussion, le gouvernement travailliste présenta, en 
janvier denier, devant le Parlement, un Livre Blanc contenant ses recommandations 
sur la réforme en relations industrielles. À part quelques exceptions mineures, le 
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Livre Blanc endossait entièrement les recommandations de la Commission et s'enga-
geait à les transcrire dans la loi dans un avenir rapproché. Ceci marque une étape 
importante dans la politique gouvernementale en ce sens que le Livre Blanc signale 
la fin de l'approche britannique libérale traditionnelle aux relations industrielles en 
faisant l'hypothèse que l'Etat a un rôle important à jouer clans la régulation des 
relations industrielles. 
Le Livre Blanc va plus loin que la Commission sur trois points principaux. Il 
propose d'abord que le CIR ait le pouvoir d'émettre des recommandations dont l'ap-
plication est obligatoire, avec sanctions financières, dans les cas impliquant des 
conflits intersyndicaux de reconnaissance. En second lieu, il recommande que le 
gouvernement ait des pouvoirs spéciaux suffisants pour exiger des syndicats la tenue 
d'un vote de grève et le respect d'une pause dite de conciliation en cas de conflit 
grave. Finalement, il propose d'établir un « Trade Union Development Scherne » afin 
de permettre aux syndicats d'obtenir des subventions pour moderniser leurs structures 
et leurs organisations. 
Les recommandations anti-grève ont provoqué une grande controverse dans le 
parti travailliste. En plus, les syndicats s'y sont opposés et les employeurs ainsi que 
l'opposition conservatrice les ont qualifiées d'inadéquates. Nous croyons que ces 
propositions ajoutent à l'arsenal d'armes gouvernementales nécessaires au traitement 
des conflits industriels. Cependant elles ne nient aucunement l'appui que donne le 
Livre Blanc à la réforme volontaire des relations industrielles. 
En dernière analyse, les points forts et les points faibles du Livre Blanc sont ceux 
du rapport Donovan. En résumé, on peut faire la même conclusion générale : les 
seules recommandations du gouvernement vont probablement fournir un modeste 
encouragement au rythme et à l'étendue de la réforme des relations industrielles. À 
ce sujet, il serait intéressant de noter que la nomination de M. George Woodcock, 
secrétaire du T.U.C., au poste de président du CIR appuie notre conclusion. En effet, 
M. Woodcock est un tenant de l'approche évolutionniste à la réforme des relations 
industrielles. 
En conclusion, le champ est encore ouvert pour une plus grande intervention 
législative en relations industrielles. Vu le déclin dans la popularité du gouvernement 
travailliste, on devrait tenir compte de la politique de l'opposition conservatrice en 
matière de réforme des relations industrielles. Dans un document daté d'avril 1968, 
les conservateurs proposent un nouveau cadre législatif aux relations industrielles, 
incluant des lois plus restrictives quant à l'utilisation de la grève et prévoyant que 
les conventions aient force de loi. Une déclaration récente des conservateurs trahit 
leur désir de traduire leurs recommandations dans la loi s'ils obtiennent une majorité 
parlementaire aux prochaines élections. 
11 ne peut y avoir de réponse définitive à la question de savoir si la publication 
du rapport Donovan et du Livre Blanc du parti travailliste marque la fin du débat 
sur la politique gouvernementale en matière de relations industrielles. L'avenir poli-
tique du parti travailliste et le bon vouloir des syndicats et des employeurs à entre-
prendre les réformes d'une façon volontaire; voilà ce qui fournira une réponse à 
notre question dans quelques années. Nous croyons cependant qu'il faut s'attendre, 
en Angleterre, à une plus grande intervention en relations industrielles dans les cinq 
prochaines années. 
